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ABSTRACT  
 
Mass killing of 1965/6 is the most serious f human rights violations in Indonesia’s history, 
which illustrated very well how systematic impunity persists even in cases considered as 
crimes against humanity. Calling for truth about mass killing of 1965/6 is crucial for the 
“historical clarification” of the nation. The study concludes that the civil society’s initia-
tives have played an important role in pushing for truth of mass killing of 1965/6 to be un-
covered. Despite prolonged political constraints and the state denial of the events of 
1965/6, civil society has been reformulating the common aim, objective, strategy and real-
istic goal. The study finds that the experiences of the civil society organization in local, 
national and international context is significant in revealing truth in as the first step in 
providing alternative knowledge to the public, and pushing for formal acknowledgement 
from the state. However, after more than 16 years of “reformasi,” the framework of transi-
tional justice has not yet been able to function properly as an integral approach in settling 
the past human rights abuses in Indonesia. “Postponed transitional justice” during these 
transitional years is still on going. Therefore, truth, justice, reparations and the guarantee of 
non-recurrence for past abuses, as a comprehensive framework of transitional justice, are 
still very difficult goals to achieve. The struggle of the Indonesian civil society to combat 
impunity during the “reformasi” era highlights an important fact that achieving the inte-
grated transitional justice approach takes a long time and requires a gradual process. 
 
Keywords: Civil Society, Truth, Transitional Justice 
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1. Introduction 
 
1. 1. Background 
 
President Soeharto’s rule over Indonesia (1966-1998) was an authoritarian regime, which 
was called the Orde Baru (New Order). Massive corruption and gross violations of human 
rights were committed systematically as measures to control and discipline society, or to 
suppress political opposition.1  
 
The mass killing2 of 1965/6, which was carried out across most parts of Indonesia, marked 
the birth of an authoritarian military regime which subsequently committed other human 
rights violations and abused state power up to the reform starting in 1998. In the aftermath 
of the 1965 coup attempt3 of the “30 September Movement” (Gerakan 30 September), 
around 500,000 people were killed across Indonesia by military officials and groups of 
civilians backed by the army, whose members came from various anti-communist militia 
groups, political parties and religious associations.4 Millions more were tortured, injured, 
disappeared, raped and imprisoned without trial or removed from their public office posi-
tions. Furthermore, thousands of students who studied abroad and even Indonesian ambas-
sadors could not return to their country, as the government revoked their passports if they 
                                                
 
1 ICG (2001), p. 1  
2 The terminology of the “mass killing” is used as the common term to illustrate the situation during 1965/6, 
even though the situation was based on mass (various) violence. During the New Order, the government is 
using the terminology of “clash”, while after “reformasi,” the common use by civil society is the “event”. 
However, there are various researchers also indicate that there was a “political killing” or “massacre” or 
“genocide” on the 1965/6. Later, the National Commission of Human Rights (Komnas HAM) stated that the 
events of 1965/6 could amount to “crimes against humanity”. 
3 “Coup attempt” is one of the finding researches of the event of 1965/6. However, there are various research 
which also indicated that elites of the PKI is involved on those event. The uncertain facts on this case are the 
indicator of the importance of the formal truth revealing by state.  
4 Cribb (1990), p. 1-42; Cribb (2001), p. 219 
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refused to declare their political allegiance to the new regime. Some of them were members 
of PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party), however most were 
simply suspected of members of the party or supporters/sympathizers. As a consequence, 
the stigmatization and discrimination for victims became embedded in society and is con-
tinuing up until through both the state’s policy and social norms.   
 
Although this massive violence is not well known by the public internationally, it is one of 
the worst cases of crimes under international law carried out after the World War II. Fur-
thermore, the authoritarian regime administered the country under the corrupt governance, 
and conducted various human rights violations all over Indonesia with the justification of 
the stability of the country for thirty-two years.  
 
Eventually, in 1998, Soeharto was forced to resign as a result of popular uprisings and pro-
test from civil society and that was the start of a democratic society in the era called refor-
mation or ‘reformasi’. The reformasi process began with a period of considerable changes 
in the governance system.  
 
While systematic human rights violations were an embedded problem in the New Order 
era, the reformasi period has sought to draw a line between the past and the future, so that 
the issue would not become a burden for the successive regimes. This can be seen by a 
number of legislative and institutional reforms to recognise international human rights 
standards. However, there has been no significant development in establishing state respon-
sibility for past abuses.  
 
As a post authoritarian regime country, a strategy to deal with the past is important to fa-
cilitate democratic transition and governance. So-called transitional justice is a framework 
to deal with the issue of how a new, more civilian and democratic regime shall come to 
terms with its past full of systematic human rights violations. The framework of transitional 
justice focuses on acknowledging victims’ rights and promoting the probabilities for peace, 
reconciliation and democracy, and most importantly to strengthen accountability for gross 
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violations of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law. This is 
clearly stipulated as an obligation under international law. The framework of transitional 
justice consists of initiatives of judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, including prosecu-
tion, truth seeking, reparation programmes, institutional reforms or an appropriate combi-
nation.5  
 
Additionally, democracy is needed to further develop political freedom, rule of law, civil 
and political liberties and supremacy of civilian supremacy. In this role, the participation of 
actors in civil society is needed to contribute to good governance. Hence, the government 
should be transparent and generally in favour of open governance, including by way of 
inviting the participation of civil society in the process of democratisation. 
  
However, the ‘truth’ about the mass killing of 1965/6 has been systematically denied and 
little, if anything has been brought to the public attention. On the other hand, the democrat-
ic transition has brought with it more openness, providing greater space for civil society to 
participate in the governance process. This has led actors in civil society to undertake vari-
ous initiatives demanding state accountability for past human rights abuses, including the 
1965/6 mass killings.  
 
1. 2. Objective, scope and research question 
 
This thesis sought to analyse the influence of civil society initiatives in revealing the truth 
about the mass killings of 1965/6 in favour of achieving the truth under the transitional 
justice framework applicable in Indonesia. 
 
For almost 16 years of “reformasi”, the Indonesian government has not developed a com-
prehensive strategy to settle the past. The case of mass killing of 1965/6 has been selected 
                                                
 
5 UN TJ (2010), p. 3 
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as a case study because it is the most serious abuse of human rights in Indonesia’s history. 
Victims and their families have suffered for almost 50 years without any acknowledgement 
of what they suffered. Most of the victims have already died, as have many of those sus-
pected of perpetrating human rights violations. Thus, the case illustrates well how system-
atic impunity persists in Indonesia even in cases where gross violations and crimes against 
humanity have occurred. 
 
Revealing the truth as part of truth-seeking based on the facts of past human rights viola-
tions is a first step to ensure that the transitional justice framework will be implemented in 
a country transitioning to democracy. Therefore, it is important to scrutinize the attitude of 
which Indonesians display towards their history. Additionally, choosing the case study of 
mass killing of 1965/6 as landmark case of crimes against humanity is important to give 
more understanding of the extent to which the state has the political will to deal with the 
past and move forward towards a better human rights condition and democracy in the fu-
ture. 
 
Therefore, the research questions throughout this thesis are: 
 -­‐ How has the transitional justice framework, in particular truth seeking policy been 
applied in reformasi era in Indonesia? 
 -­‐ How do civil society initiatives aimed at revealing truth of mass killing of 1965/6 
influence the truth-seeking policy under transitional justice framework in Indone-
sia?  
 -­‐ How does the state respond to the civil society’s initiatives in revealing truth of 
mass killing of 1965/6?  
 
Furthermore, to limit the scope of the assessment and thus make it realistic, I have a limita-
tion category of civil society definition, which mainly the civil society organization, includ-
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ing NGO’s. I also chosen a number of initiatives that illustrate how initiatives of civil soci-
ety in achieving the truth of mass killing 1965/6 under the transitional justice framework 
were implemented. I divided with two initiatives of civil society. Firstly, is the initiative 
through the formal mechanism, by urging the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) and the Human Rights Court (HRC). Secondly, is the initiative in re-
vealing the truth through informal or unofficial mechanism. Apart from various efforts by 
civil society, I am choosing the example effort from local, national and international initia-
tives. At the local level, I am choosing the initiative by SKP HAM Palu (Solidaritas 
Keluarga Korban Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia, Solidarity for Victims of Human 
Rights Violation), one of the victims’ communities in Palu, Central Sulawesi Province who 
have successfully advocated for a local regulation on reparation for victims and most im-
portantly the acknowledgement on the mass killing of 1965/6 in Central Sulawesi by their 
Mayor. At the national level, I am choosing the effort of the KKPK (Koalisi Keadilan dan 
Pengungkapan Kebenaran, Indonesia Coalition for Justice and Revelation of Truth), who 
conducted a “Year of Truth” in 2013. This coalition consists of various non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), which aims to find synergies and a common strategy to strengthen 
advocacy efforts and deliver concert results for victims and their families. At the interna-
tional level, at last, I am assessing the publicity of the documentary film “The Act of Kill-
ing” (TAoK), which received various awards and recognition internationally and contribut-
ed to acknowledgement of the mass killing of 1965/6 in Indonesia.  
 
As various academic researchers have studied the development of legal reform in the polit-
ical context of the transitional justice framework in Indonesia, this assessment focuses on 
the initiatives of civil society to expose the truth and to foster state accountability. 
 
1. 3. Methodology  
 
The research uses qualitative research in social science methodology, applying socio-legal 
as well as social science approaches. The method is to analyse data and information by way 
of a critical case study. The primary focus is to answer the three research questions. There-
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fore, the thesis relies primarily on analysis of secondary resources of literature studies. UN 
human rights documentations, Indonesian laws and regulations, extensive reading of aca-
demic, books, journals, NGO reports, government documents and relevant electronic 
newspaper articles inform this research. Furthermore, the research draws from 8 interviews 
with a range of actors with expertise and experience on the struggles for truth and justice 
for the 1965/6 mass killings, including human rights and civil society activists, government 
representatives and human rights experts. 
 
In addition, this research also draws on my own experiences following the political process 
in Indonesia and being involved personally in civil society struggles for the promotion of 
human rights in the transition democratic in Indonesia. I have been working in one of the 
leading NGOs in Indonesia, KontraS, (Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak 
Kekerasan, The Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence)6 for more than 
10 years, where I have played a major role assisting the victims of human rights violation 
in their struggle to pursue truth and justice of past systematic abuses. I also recognize that 
there have been many initiatives from civil society, particularly the NGOs to influence the 
political process during the transitional period.  
 
1. 4. Structure 
  
Chapter one is introduces the background of the study and states the problem by formulat-
ing the research questions and specifying the objective and scope to study, the basic meth-
odology and the structure.  
 
                                                
 
6 KontraS was established in 20 March 1998, just few months before Soeharto falling down. The capital S 
perceived to signify Soeharto, showing that the organization was explicitly contra or against Soeharto, which 
conducted human rights violation massively. Further information: www.kontras.org 
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Chapter two provides an explanation of the key concept of transitional justice framework, 
and then moves to focus on the right to truth. It then describes the concept of civil society 
in transitional justice framework.   
 
Chapter three explores how this framework can be applied to the Indonesian context. The 
chapter starts by exploring the political transition in Indonesia and the state denial in re-
vealing the truth of 1965/6 mass killings. 
 
Chapter four describes the civil society initiatives aimed at revealing the truth of the mass 
killing of 1965/6. It examines both formal and informal truth-seeking initiatives and evalu-
ates their effectiveness and impact. 
 
Chapter five examines state responses to civil society initiatives aimed at addressing past 
human rights abuses, including mass killing 1965/6, during the administration of Presiden-
tial Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. It is divided of three areas focus: the state response in the 
truth initiatives policy from civil society, state responses to unofficial truth initiatives from 
civil society; and attitudes by state actors and key government towards the 1965/6 mass 
killings which either seek to deny of justify the events of 1965/6.  
 
Chapter six provides and analysis of the role of civil society in achieving truth and their 
influences under the transitional justice framework in Indonesia. 
 
Finally, chapter seven is summarizing the findings of the thesis topic. 
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2. The concept of transitional justice framework, right to truth and the role of 
civil society under the transitional justice framework  
 
2. 1. Key concepts of the transitional justice framework 
 
The issue of transitional justice has developed as one of the controversial discourses in the 
human rights sector since the early 1990s, when a series of transformations occurred from 
authoritarian regimes into more democratic regimes in Latin America, South Africa and 
Eastern Europe.7 Massive and systematic human rights violence as well as corruption oc-
curred under authoritarian repressive rule. When finally they moved on towards democratic 
regimes, they had to deal with various problems of the past to achieve a better governance 
phase in the future. In addition, the challenge for new democracy is to properly face past 
evils without destabilizing the new democracy or threatening scenarios for future develop-
ment.8   
 
Therefore, usually states and people are at a crossroads: how to settle past accounts and 
how to prevent that the human rights violations continue in the future. The conflict usually 
arises from a tension between approaches of either forgetting the past to avoid the fury of 
the perpetrators and their cronies, and meeting ethical and political requirements to be able 
to deal with the violations in the previous government.9  Some argue that the best way to 
build up the future is to forget the past, which could remind people of the details of the vio-
lations and draw attention to the wrongdoers, bringing a political problem to the surface 
and dividing the society in the country. While, in some part, particularly victims’ groups 
argue that revealing the truth and building the collective memory is a process of recon-
structing the representations of the past in the light of the present.10  
                                                
 
7 Benomar (1995), p.xix-xxi. 
8 Garton Ash (1998), p. 35. 
9 Hayner (2010), p. 10. 
10 Teitel (2000), p. 70. 
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In the theoretical discourse, the meaning of “justice” in transitional justice is problematic. 
The legalist human rights perspective and human rights advocates believe that punishment 
is a tool to prevent future violations because it will have a deterrent effect. They consider 
that amnesty for the perpetrators of human rights violation must be abolished and they en-
dorse prosecution for wrongdoing.11 They are considers that full retributive or corrective 
justice is important for democratization and liberal change. Therefore, they consider justice 
as punishment to the perpetrator, being the central theme of transitional justice. However, 
the retributive justice focuses on prosecution of the individual actor of the violation of hu-
man rights.12 The only way to bring a demarcation from the past to the future is to prose-
cute the prior regime and build a rule of law as an essential principle in democratic govern-
ance. The failure of the new governance to prosecute past human rights violations of prior 
regimes represent a prolonged effort to escape accountability regarding the previous re-
gime.13 Consequently, the idea to bring justice should be considered as a basic standard 
universally and become a part of the international human rights discourse.  
 
On the other hand, the politicians and political scholars support a political realistic ap-
proach, which believes that the law is only a product of political processes. The realists 
argue that promotion of human rights must be understood as a political relation or process 
rather than simply just a legal process.14 The past human rights violations were usually 
committed in a systematic and widespread way with structural responsibility by the previ-
ous regime. Therefore, it is impossible to prosecute the individual actor of organized 
crimes. The “truth for amnesty” policy itself is a necessary political compromise.15  
 
                                                
 
11 Benomar  (1995), p. 33. 
12 Opcit, p. 56. 
13 Teitel (2006), p. 146. 
14 Thomas, Sikkink (1999) 
15 Gutman, Thopson, (2000), p. 26. 
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However, pragmatically, most of the recent approach of transitional justice cannot establish 
a new solid democratic system. In a transition period, the various lines of reform are still 
influenced by the crony’s actors of the previous regime. They are influencing the democrat-
ic transition process to avoid accountability of the past. Political democracies are usually 
overturned by conspiracies linking with several different actors, which usually later will 
receive mass support, and it could contribute special leverage to manipulation.16 Therefore, 
the rule of law establish should be based on the practical considerations and politically ne-
gotiated. On the other hand, the rule of law itself can strengthen and facilitate transitional 
developments. The rule of law is historically and politically related. The idea of justice is 
contextual, placed between the legal and political direction of a country.17  
 
In a similar way, the study of transitional justice has been developed in the last two decades 
at the UN (United Nation). In 2011, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, 
Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non Recurrence reported and recommended on vari-
ous issues on the transitional justice perspective.18 According to his specific mandate, the 
focus on the implementation of transitional justice framework should cover:  
 
“Truth, justice, reparation and guarantee of non recurrence as measures that are re-
lated to and can reinforce, one another, when implemented to redress the legacies of 
the gross violations of human rights and serious violations of international humanitari-
an law.19” 
 
 
 
                                                
 
16 Guillermo, Schmitter (1986), p. 20. 
17 Opcit, p. 7 and 9. 
18 Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence 
A/HRC/18/L/22 (2011); A/HRC/RES/18/7 (2011 
19 Report Pablo De Greiff, A/HRC/21/46 (2012) 
 15 
2. 2. Truth seeking and transitional justice 
 
The right to truth as a basic right to an effective remedy is one of the essential rights of the 
victims and their families of gross violations of human rights, and serious violations of in-
ternational humanitarian law. It includes the right to know the truth about the violation they 
have suffered, the identity of perpetrators, and the cause of violations. The right to truth 
relates to serious violations of human rights, but it is most recognized in regard to the issue 
of enforced disappearances.20  
 
The right to the truth with regard to gross and serious violations of human rights is an inal-
ienable and autonomous right. The right is connected to the responsibility and obligation of 
the state to protect and guarantee human rights, to conduct effective investigation, and to 
ensure effective remedy and reparations.21 Furthermore, understanding what actually oc-
curred during violations, under the authoritarian regime, is part of individual rights and 
collective rights.22 Individually, victims and relatives have the right to know the truth re-
garding gross violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, particularly 
for the cases of enforced disappearances. In addition, due to the enormity of the violations, 
the general public has also a right to know the reason, and hear an explanation, as to why 
such gross violations took place.  
 
However, truth seeking relates to the fulfillment of the right to truth and becomes an essen-
tial aspect of the transitional justice framework. Truth seeking is also becoming an ap-
proach used to place the victims’ interest in revealing the truth into the transitional justice 
framework. The victim’s focus seeks to recognize the dignity and voice of those who have 
suffered. Victim’s rights are usually linked with the right to reparation, but should also be 
associated with several other aspects of the victim’s needs, such as retributive justice and 
                                                
 
20 Gonzales Varney (2013), p. 3. 
21 Study on the right to truth, E/CN.4/2006/91, para 55.  
22 ECHR, El-Masri v the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 13 December 2012, para 191.  
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the right to truth. Related terms such as “victims-centered” approaches or “victims-
oriented” perspectives are integrated as what actually constitutes victim’s rights.23 Victims 
should be at the center as a “truth holder” of their experience in the past.24 
 
Another discourse on the concept of truth was also developed based on the report of TRC 
in South Africa, in 1998, which recognized the four concepts of truth in the transitional 
justice framework. Firstly, the factual truth is based on factual or objective information and 
evidence collected or received. Secondly, personal truth or narrative truth is based on the 
personal interview, both of victims and perpetrators. Collecting all personal truth will build 
the narrative truth, which can contribute to the process of reconciliation.  Thirdly is the so-
cial or dialogical truth, which comes from the experience established through interaction, 
discussion, and debate, which need society’s participation. Finally, the healing or restora-
tive truth places facts in the context of human relationships, both among citizens and be-
tween the state and its citizens.25   
 
Related to these concepts, truth is associated with knowledge and acknowledgment. 
“Knowledge” includes various truth or interpretations conducted by the participants in vio-
lation. However, “acknowledgment” should be emphasized under the healing or restorative 
truth because the facts must be fully and publicly acknowledged. Therefore, victims and 
survivors should have a significant role in acknowledgement as part of the truth element of 
transitional justice.  Even the when knowledge of what actually occurred is obtained, it is 
important to have perpetrators acknowledge what they did. Its effect on victims can also be 
crucial for justice, reconciliation and peace building.26  
 
In the judicial process the focus is more on the perpetrators side. Therefore, the truth com-
                                                
 
23 Garcia Godos, Lekha Sriram (2013), p. 4 
24 Report Pablo de Greiff, A/HRC/21/46, (2012), para 54. 
25 TRC of South Africa Report (1998), p. 110-114  
26 Lambourne (2014), p. 28. 
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mission is an essential tool for revealing the truth. However, conducting the “official” truth 
process assumes a degree of democratic consensus. In a transition period the democratic 
process is often not fully consolidated, with consequences for the authority and legitimacy 
of any transitional construction of knowledge.27 Nevertheless, the National Human Rights 
Institution (NHRI) could become a significant actor in ensuring the fulfilment of the right 
to truth for victims, relatives and society. By conducting fact finding investigations and 
public reports on past human rights violations, the NHRI can contribute to exposing the 
truth.28  
 
Truth seeking is seen as the first step to acknowledge other principles under transitional 
justice framework, which are justice, reparation and the guarantee for non-recurrence. 
Moreover, the right to truth is connected with other rights, such as the right to an effective 
remedy, the right to legal and judicial prosecution, the right to family life, the right to an 
effective investigation, the right to a hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial 
tribunal, the right to reparation, the right to be free from torture and ill treatment and the 
right to seek and impart information.29 The right to truth relates to the principle of transpar-
ency and good governance as a concrete expression of the constitutional values of human 
dignity, rule of law and democratic government.30  
 
Hence, truth is considered as the primary foundation of accountability, making prosecution 
possible, providing effective remedy for victims and setting up structural governance re-
form. By revealing the truth, the government could provide the knowledge to the society by 
recording the “historical clarification” on the past offences as an obligation to preserve the 
memory. The truth becomes an entry to historical discontinuity between the situation in the 
past and the promising future. The historical truth can influence social life and can encour-
                                                
 
27 Teitel (2000), p. 83. 
28 Study on the right to truth, E/CN.4/2006/91, para 51. 
29 Ibid, para 57. 
30 Ibid, para 46. 
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age the present regime to restructure society’s power structure. Consequently, historical 
truth is justice itself.31 
 
On the other hand, in many countries, while transitional democratic rulers reluctantly inte-
grate the transitional justice framework - including truth seeking – into their governance 
strategy, various actors of civil society initiated unofficial truth telling. The concept of truth 
telling is recognizing the truth behind a previous period, often involving both violence and 
secrecy, and has become more significant. Unofficial truth telling was conducted in various 
models, which facilitated a high degree of victims’ participation.32 While the effort lacks 
the acknowledgment from the government, the strategy is important for knowledge in rec-
ognizing the narrative truth and historical truth among societies. 
 
2. 3.  Civil society and transitional justice 
 
In specific terminology on the transitional justice framework, civil society is defined as a 
conceptual term referring to a broad spectrum of political and non-political actors (such as 
grassroots organizations, religious groups, university, victims’ community and others). On 
the other hand, the term the Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) refers to the formally 
established organization that is recognized by the government and the public.33 
 
The UN study is recommends that the transitional justice measures should strengthen the 
rule of law in countries, as it has the purpose of promoting a just social order and recogni-
tion, truth and reconciliation with a strong catalytic role in meaningful participation of civil 
society organization. In addition to that, the strategy should also cover the victims-centred 
approach and the integration of a gender perspective.34  
                                                
 
31 Teitel (2000), p. 69. 
32 Bickfored (2007), p. 994-1035. 
33 Roht-Arriaza (2003), p. v. 
34 Report Pablo de Greiff, A/HRC/21/46 (2012); A/67/368 (2012) 
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However, the civil society in transition governance often acts as an instrument for social 
movements, mobilising and articulating transformation.35 Globally, civil society organiza-
tions have often played significant roles in promoting and supporting transitional justice 
experiments.36  
 
Furthermore, the competence of NGOs and other civil society actors justifies a role in ad-
dressing human rights issues that develop in transitional settings.37 The strength of civil 
society will partly determine the success of any transitional justice initiative. Their contri-
bution can be critical because of information, contacts and expertise in human rights is-
sues.38 More specifically, civil society organizations can play a significant function in de-
liberating on formulating, scheduling, prioritizing goals and in the community they can 
provide victim assistance, conduct investigations and organize adversarial public action.39  
 
Therefore the competence of NGOs and other civil society actors validate a role in address-
ing human rights issues that arise in the international setting.40 Furthermore, the UN is also 
strengthening the importance on the designing and implementing transitional justice pro-
cess and mechanism by engaging with various actors. Coordinating between UN and non-
UN actors (such as donors, non-governmental organizations and private organizations) is 
equally critical and should be improved through cooperation, coordination and information 
during the implementation of the framework.41 
 
                                                
 
35 The Danish Institute of Human Rights (2004), p. 1.  
36 Brahmn (2007), p. 62. 
37 Backer (2003), p. 297. 
38 Hayner, P (2005) p. 45. 
39 Crocker (1999), p.381, 384-390. 
40 Backer (2010), p. 297. 
41 UN TJ  (2010), p. 7.
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3. The context of mass killings of 1965/6 in Indonesia’s political transition  
 
3. 1. Political transition in Indonesia 
 
Currently, Indonesia faces new political governance. The presidential election will be con-
ducted this year and will appoint the 7th president after its independence.  
 
New Order took over from previous regime marked by massive human rights violations 
and abuses. State, through military agency, had strong power to control and influence soci-
ety in various aspects of people’s lives. Massive human rights violations were considered 
systematic in this period. Prior to the establishment of the New Order regime, mass killing 
1965/6 was occurred. Soeharto emerged to power after millions of people were arbitrarily 
executed, detained, disappeared and imprisoned without trial. There was also a purge of 
any public officials and members of security forces within the state structure who were 
affiliated to the PKI. Furthermore, governance restricted the civil and political freedom. 
The regime used the need for political stability as a justification to supress freedom of ex-
pression and perpetrated massive human rights violation, some of them being considered as 
crimes under international law. Subsequently, Soeharto maintained his 32 years in power 
by using security forces to commit systematic, large-scale human rights violations.  
 
In 1998, Soeharto was forced to resign due to mass demonstrations from Indonesian people 
initiated by the student movement in several large cities in the country. The Reformasi pro-
cess started with a period of considerable transformation of the political and legal system. 
While systematic human rights violations were an inherent problem in New Order era, in 
the Reformasi period one has been trying to draw a line between the past and the future, so 
that the issue would not become a burden for upcoming regimes. At least this effort was 
carried out in the formal manner, rather than that there were substantial outcomes in prac-
tice.  
 
Furthermore, since Reformasi, the discourse of human rights emerged and was integrated in 
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an early agenda of legislative and institutional reform. A number of legislative and institu-
tional reforms were carried out to conform to the principles of democracy, rule of law and 
international human rights standards. In addition, the government became a significant 
player in the promotion of human rights in regional and international arena to complement 
its domestic reform, mostly to gain the international community’s trust in how Indonesia 
has changed its image. Human rights language became a tool of political campaigns as well 
as a tool for building the country’s image internationally. On the other hand, this political 
situation supported civilian supremacy, in the sense that civil society have ample oppor-
tunity to be involved and to contribute to the political transition process in Indonesia using 
the human rights discourse openly, including to raise demands for state accountability for 
past human rights violations.  
 
I would like to describe in more detail the political transition in Indonesia, in particular of 
the human rights agenda in Reformasi era, which influences the state responsibility process 
as regards the mass killing of 1965/6. The information below is based on the categorized of 
the three phases of reformasi, (waves of “reformasi”), which describe in the joint report of 
KontraS and ICTJ.42  
 
The first phase was the early reformation, which was called the momentous change phase 
(1998-2000). In 1999, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) enacted the resolution 
TAP MPR IV/1999 on the National Policy Guideline for 1999-2004 that explicitly 
acknowledged that during the New Order era, there had been “fractured protection and 
promotion of human rights, demonstrated by various human rights violations, in forms that 
include violence, discrimination and abuse of power.” Moreover, the resolution recom-
mended that the state should develop “a legal system that guarantees the supremacy of the 
rule of law and human rights based on justice and truth.” Meanwhile, in 2000, the MPR 
enacted resolution TAP MPR V/2000 on Strengthening National Unity and Integrity. The 
                                                
 
42 KontraS and ICTJ were assessing the implementation of the transitional justice framework on 13 years of 
“reformasi” (1998-2011). KontraS  and ICTJ (2011) p. 12-14.   
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resolution acknowledged the past human rights abuses and recommended the establishment 
of “a national truth and reconciliation commission with the task to uphold the truth by dis-
closing abuses of power and past violations of human rights and initiating reconciliation.”  
 
In addition to that, the parliament amended the constitution, which was also acknowledging 
the human rights promotion in the Second Amendment of Constitution in 2002.  
 
Furthermore, in this period, the new government released many political prisoners, includ-
ing more than one million detainees from the 1965/6 mass violence cases, who had been 
accused of being involved in the PKI. On the other hand, the government has also enacted 
Law 26/2000 on HRC, as a strategy to avoid the international tribunal, which was proposed 
by the UN to prosecute the military allegations of human rights violations during the refer-
endum in 1999 in East Timor. Subsequently, this situation led to the creation of a new judi-
cial mechanism, which can deal with special crimes. The law, which was initially passed 
only to deal with the East Timor 1999 atrocities, has jurisdiction over any gross violations 
of human rights happened since Indonesia’s independence day. This was actually the out-
come of a demand from Islamic parties to include several gross violations of human rights 
cases perpetrated against the Muslim communities, particularly the Tanjung Priok 1984 
cases when the military forces brutally committed extrajudicial executions to hundreds of 
protesters in Jakarta. At this stage, Indonesia had two formal measures to address the past 
human rights violation, including through judicial mechanisms. 
 
The second phase of reformasi was the period of compromised mechanisms (2001-2006). 
There were two compromised mechanisms for accountability: the human rights courts as an 
unpredicted outcome of East Timor 1999 atrocities and Tanjung Priok, and the national 
TRC that had been planned earlier. However, the law on human rights courts contained 
major weaknesses. The trials are intended to fail, since mostly security forces personnel 
were unsuccessful in establishing accountability, and all perpetrators were eventually ac-
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quitted. Moreover, the trials are lack of the victims participation and did not provide for 
reparation for the victims. 43 Furthermore, in this period, the Constitutional Court revoked 
the entire TRC law, which was not only challenged by human rights organizations for 
breaching international human rights standards, but also by some hard line Islamic groups 
which refused to be accountable for the 1965/6 mass killings. 
 
During a long period from 1976, military operations had been going on in Aceh and pro-
ducing massive human rights violations. This was settled under the peace agreement be-
tween the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement. Law 11/2006 recom-
mended special autonomy for Aceh, including the establishment of a human rights court 
and a TRC for past abuses in Aceh.  As a political compromise to comply with the agree-
ment, the Indonesian government ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) in 2006. 
 
Then, the third phase of reformasi was called the stalled reform (2007-2011).  Although the 
Komnas HAM continued to conduct credible investigations and recommended formal 
criminal investigations, no one has been tried in the special human rights court. The Attor-
ney General’s Office (AGO), who is responsible for the prosecution process, refused to 
follow up on the recommendations of Komnas HAM.44  
 
The illustration of Jose Zalaquett, in which he describes three types of political constraints 
confronted by new transitional countries, is useful to understand Indonesia’s political tran-
sition within the transitional justice framework.45 Firstly, the political transition is facing a 
                                                
 
43 ICTJ (2003) 
44 All cases were recommended as the crimes against humanity cases: 1). Trisakti Semanggi 1998/9; 2). May 
1999; 3). Wasior (2001/2) and Wamena (2003); 4). Student activist enforced disappearances 1997/8; 5). Ta-
langsari 1989 and 6). Crimes Against Humanity 1965/6. 
45 Zalaquett (1995), pp. 18-19. 
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situation of unsettled armed conflict or accumulating social, ethnic, politics or religious 
problems. The transition produced weak governance while facing strong political opposi-
tion and armed involvement, which often commit human rights abuses. Secondly, the pre-
vious regime has lost their legitimacy but still maintains its control of armed forces and the 
political transition is carried out by a gradual change. In this situation the defeated forces 
still have significant political access and can bargain with the new actors under their own 
agenda, including protecting the previous regime’s interest. Almost most all of the policies 
are established by political negotiation. The fulfilment of a human rights agenda takes 
place in the form of normative and institutional gradual reform, however in some part it has 
also become a justification for the willingness of the government to comply with the de-
mocratisation process.  
 
Under the assessment above, it is clear that the government’s political will to implement its 
human rights policies and enact various regulations depends on political pressure, both do-
mestically and internationally. Therefore, the second typology on the political constraint is 
the closest explanation to the Indonesia’s political transition context. In this type the 
changes could actually be a ‘postponed transitional justice’.46 Furthermore, the continuing 
lack of accountability for these human rights violations, among them a wide range of 
crimes against humanity during and after the New Order regime has created a culture of 
impunity in Indonesia.47 Impunity is defined as: 
 
“the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of violations to ac-
count – whether in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings – since 
they are not subject to any inquiry that might lead to their being accused, arrested, 
tried and, if found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to making reparations 
to their victims.”48 
                                                
 
46 Elster (2004), p. 76. 
47 Meijer (2006) 
48 Orentlitcher UN Doc.E/CN.4/2005/102/Add/1, 8 Feburary 2005. 
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3. 2. State denial of he mass killings of 1965/6  
 
Stanley Cohen reviews three patterns of official denials which governments maintained in 
response to state violence accusations.49 First, the “literal denial” (nothing is happening) is 
the type of government’s denial for all allegations of human rights abuses. Usually, it ap-
plies in an authoritarian regime or repressive regime. The denial can occur when the state 
controls the civilian freedom of expression and mass media information. Secondly, the “in-
terpretive denial,” which literally means, “What is happening is really something else”. 
This type of denial occurs when the government faces difficulties in maintaining literal 
denial. Thus, they acknowledge partial facts about the violation, but provide another inter-
pretation about the facts. Thirdly is the “implicatory denial,” which acknowledges, “What 
is happening is justified”. The government who uses excessive power in a state of emer-
gency is usually using this type of denial. This also applies when the government does not 
deny the facts or the original interpretation of a fact, but justifies it by political rationaliza-
tion.  
 
Throughout the authoritarian regime, the official version of the G-30-S/PKI (30th Septem-
ber Movement of the Indonesian Communist Party) was written in the textbooks published 
by the State Secretariat of Indonesia. The book described the background, response and the 
crushing of the PKI by the Indonesian government. 50 In brief, it explained that there was an 
attempted coup, which was systematically planned by the PKI to take over the state on 1 
October 1965. The PKI allegedly kidnapped and killed six generals in Lubang Buaya, after 
torturing some of them. The Gerwani (Indonesian Women’s Movement),51 one of the big-
gest women’s political organizations at the time, was accused of being involved in these 
                                                
 
49 Cohen (2000), p. 102-110.  
50 Sekretariat Negara RI (1994) 
51 The New Order finally prohibited Gerwani, accused as to have political affiliation to the PKI on 1965. This 
organization was acknowledged as the first progressive women organization and was initially established to 
strengthen the political role of Indonesian women in the independence struggle. 
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killings. Stories about torture, brutality and genital mutilation were circulated widely. Af-
terwards, the generals became national heroes. Soeharto, a military commander “softly” 
assumed power from the previous President, Soekarno. Thus, the PKI was dismissed and 
communism, Marxism and Leninism were prohibited under the Temporary People’s As-
sembly (MPRS) resolution TAP MPRS XXV/MPRS/1966. This official explanation be-
came part of the school curriculum in the country. In addition, the government produced a 
propaganda film G-30-S/PKI,52 which was showed annually on state television every 30 of 
September. The government also commemorated the killing annually with an official na-
tional day of remembrance and a ceremony at Lubang Buaya, which was named as Hari 
Kesaktian Pancasila (The Day of the Sacredness of Pancasila) on every First of October.  
 
On the other hand, there was no official history followed up after the coup, including about 
the killings of members of communist party and its affiliated organizations across the coun-
try. The governance used the terminology of “clash” instead of mass killings and conclud-
ed, “The bloodbath among members of society was directly related to events in the past.”53 
The existence of thousands of political prisoners was not recognized publicly. In the early 
1980s, New Order regime released 35,000 to 10,000 political prisoners, because of enor-
mous pressure from the international community.54 However, they still were recognizable 
as “Ex Tapol” and had their identity cards marked with the symbol of ‘ET’, which means 
ex- political prisoner. They had an obligation to regularly report to the local military office 
and were limited in their freedom of association, expression and employment. They and 
their family members were barred from certain public professions, including to becoming 
military and police personnel, teachers and religious clerics. While the regime was repres-
sive, there was no alternative source of information regarding the situation. The govern-
ment took control of the media.  
 
                                                
 
52 Film Penumpasan Pengkhianatan G-30-S/PKI, 1984. 
53 Notosusanto and Saleh (1989)  
54 Jetschke in Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999), p. 140. 
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Soon after reformasi, a lot of alternative information was revealed. Various studies were 
trying to examine the situation; not just the killings of the generals, but also the mass kill-
ing afterwards. Different studies acknowledge the historical account of the events.55 Even 
though there is no official truth in the history as yet, several scholars found that the coup is 
not really conducted by PKI. Some of the elites of PKI was involved, but not as a policy 
organization in systematically. Instead, the military (under the lead of General Soeharto) 
made a scenario to blame the PKI and take over the country from the previous President, 
Soekarno. Soeharto also received support from western countries (United States, United 
Kingdom, Australia, Netherlands and many other countries) to conduct a “war against 
communists” in various different forms.56  
 
According to a number of these scientific studies, the 1965/6 mass killings took place 
across Indonesia, and the number of people killed was estimated as between 500,000 and 
more than one million, at the hands of military and civilians. These civilians came from 
various anti-communist political parties and religious groups.57 In between 1965-1967, 
around 600,000-750,000 people who were supposed to be members and supporters of PKI 
were detained and placed in detention concentration camp without trials58 and divided in 
three categories of detainees.59 The victims were largely members of PKI and also their 
                                                
 
55 Ben Anderson and McVey RT (1971), “A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia, 
Modern Indonesia Project”; Olle Tornquist (1984), “Dilemmas of Third World Communism: The Destruc-
tion of PKI in Indonesia”; Robert Cribb (1990), “Introduction: Problems in the Historiography of the Kill-
ings in Indonesia,” in Robert Cribb (ed), “The Indonesian Killings 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali”; 
Geoffrey Robinson (1995), “The Dark Side of Paradise. Polical Violence in Bali”; John Roosa (2006), “Pre-
text for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movment and Suharto’s Coup D’etat in Indonesia,”; Katherine Mc 
Gregor (2009), “The Indonesian Killings of 1965/1966”; Douglas Kammen and Katherine Mc Gregor (2012), 
“Contours of Mass Violence in Indonesia 1965-1968.”  
56 Simpson (2008), Kammen and Mc Gregor (2012). 
57 Cribb (1990), p. 1-42 
58 Fealy (1995), p. 4f. 
59 Bulletin Tapol (1987); Mc Gregor (2009), p. 5-6. 
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families, the members of various organizations, which had openly affiliated with the PKI60 
or just ordinary people who were accused of being supporters or sympathizers of PKI only 
for attending some socio-cultural events organized by the PKI or its affiliated organiza-
tions. Furthermore, the Chinese community was also specifically targeted as victims due to 
the supposed relationship between the PKI and the Chinese communist regime. The killing 
was ranked as one of the twentieth century’s most extensive mass murders61 and was seen 
as a victory over communism at the peak period of the Cold War. Hence, the mass killings 
of 1965/6 evolved into an established state policy of violence under future governance62 
and became a significant period in the political history of Indonesia.63   
 
However, the governments after 1998 have made very few changes to acknowledge the 
truth and provide justice for the 1965/6 mass killings during the reformasi era. Although in 
general, the government still failed to establish accountability to the 1965/6 mass killings, 
there were some partial measures taken by them. In 1999, the new President Habibie 
(1998-1999) released all political prisoners, including those who were accused in 1965 of 
the attempted coup. Habibie’s government also enacted Law No. 3/1999 on general elec-
tions, which has granted ex-political detainees, including those who were accused of the 
1965 case, the right to vote.  
 
During the rule of President Abdurrachman Wahid (Gus Dur, 1999-2001), he initiated poli-
cies on revealing the truth of 1965, providing for victims’ rights and building reconcilia-
tion. The law on TRC was drafted. Furthermore, Wahid enacted Presidential Instruction 
1/2000 focusing on the problem of numerous Indonesians abroad who had not been able to 
return home after the presumed coup in 1965, which aimed to facilitate their return to In-
                                                
 
60 BTI (Indonesian Farmer’s Union), SOBSI (The Indonesian Workers Union), LEKRA (The Indonesian 
People Culture Institute), Gerwani (The Indonesian Women Movement) and PR (The People Youth).   
61 Blumenthal, Mc Cormack (2007), pp. 80-81. 
62 Tornquist (2009), p. 16. 
63 Cribb (1995), p. 241. 
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donesia. However, there was no follow up on his instruction.  During his presidential peri-
od, he was also a long-time leader of one of the biggest Islamic mass organization in Indo-
nesia, NU (Nahdatul Ulama, “the awakening of the religious scholar”). In a national televi-
sion programme in March 2000, he ask apology to the victims and proposed to officially 
lift the prohibition on communism. He referred to the fact that members of the NU were 
involved in the killings of alleged communists in 1965. He also encouraged the NU to con-
duct a process of reconciliation.64 Later, senior members of the NU institution rejected Gus 
Dur’s apology to the victims of 1965.  
 
Meanwhile, the government of President Megawati Soekarnoputri (a daughter of the first 
President, Soekarno, 2001-2004) attempted to rewrite the history of the 30 September coup 
and the subsequent violence. The government established a team of historians to publish a 
book for educational purposes.65 Megawati initiated the revision of the curriculum for sec-
ondary schools, which removed the terminology PKI from the official name of the Septem-
ber Coup in history books in 2006. However, there was a lot of opposition to her initiative 
and it wasn’t developed into an official state policy.  
 
Therefore, the official state denial status – even at the national level – about the “truth” 
mass killing 1965/6 was gradually changed during Indonesia’s political transition history. 
During New Order era, the government applied “literal denial” of the truth. However, on 
certain occasions in “reformasi,” the denial was changed to “interpretive denial,” while the 
government was seeking an alternative but incomprehensive explanation. Furthermore, 
from the process of the political transition, the framework of transitional justice is not high-
ly integrated in the governance policy.  
 
 
                                                
 
64 Kafil Yamin (2000) 
65 Abdullah, Abdurrachman and Gunawan (2012)  
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4. Civil society initiatives in revealing the truth about the mass killings of 1965/6 
case 
 
4. 1. Civil society and transitional justice in Indonesia  
 
Several new actors emerged and identified as civil society in Indonesia since the emerge of 
“reformasi” They are victim groups, research institutions, religious institutions, parties, 
media, communities and civil society organization or NGOs, which were concerned with 
general human rights issues.66 However, in this study, I will more focus on the civil society 
organization, particularly NGO’s role under the transitional justice framework.  
 
After the mass killing of 1965/6, the civil society was weak. Due to the lack of freedom of 
expression, assembly and association, the civil society activities were restricted. However, 
in 1970s, a number of Indonesian NGOs were established and started to exchange infor-
mation with their international counterparts. This was the context when there was an 
emerging campaign on the release of political prisoners of the 1965/6 cases.67  
 
However, the civil society was not organized very well and mostly work based on the par-
ticular segment related with different local problems. The situation was better developed 
when the state committed massive human rights violations in East Timor, Papua and Aceh. 
To respond to these massive human rights violations, civil society performed a critical 
function as watchdog and chose to act as agents of change. The important role of these 
groups has been discussed since the late 1980’s, during the state oppression and stagnation 
political process. Even though civil society organizations were working on the ground, dis-
cussions and reflection activities rose up and they formulated new forms of political mani-
                                                
 
66 Farid, Simarmata, (2004), p. v. 
67 Jetschke in Risse, Ropp, Sikkink (1999), p. 55.  
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festation, including dealing with the cases of human rights violation.68 Towards the end of 
New Order, the human rights movement became more diversified and specialised.69 
 
In “reformasi era” in particular the human rights NGOs grew out in numbers and took 
principal activity of the legal aid organizations, which was to provide legal services to the 
underprivileged and marginalized people. However, in the beginning of the period, most of 
the organizations still refused to build strategic relationships with the government institu-
tions whereas the government had also started to establish a democratic governance system. 
In addition to this, the distrust between the government and civil society organizations was 
still ongoing in the new regime.  
 
Furthermore, the NGOs, which are focusing on human rights advocacy, began to multiply 
immediately just before New Order’s demise.70 However, support of human rights work 
from international NGOs, particularly donor agencies was limited. Few donor agency or-
ganizations did not yet decide to sponsor major initiatives to deal “with the past abuses.”71 
The human rights advocacy movement still faces difficult political challenge.72  
 
On 2004, the ICTJ conducted a survey of transitional justice initiatives throughout Indone-
sia to the non-governmental organization, victims based organization, research and aca-
demic institutions and religious groups, which were working on the issue of truth seeking 
mechanisms, prosecution, legal and institutional reform, reparation, rehabilitation and rec-
onciliation. In brief, all the initiatives were categorized into several activities. Truth seeking 
mechanisms are consisting of activities of statement and testimonies taking, fact-finding 
missions, archival research and documentation, public event commemorations and monu-
                                                
 
68 Opcit, p. 29. 
69 Priyono, Adi Prasetyo, Tornquist (2003), p. 509.  
70 Ibid, p. 508. 
71 Farid and Simarmata (2004), p. vi. 
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ments, publication and dissemination of information. The initiative to realize prosecution 
includes activities of legal claim, legal drafting, training of law enforcement personnel, 
public education and campaign and court monitoring. Furthermore, legal and institutional 
reform proposal is policy research, monitoring, public education and campaign and tech-
nical assistance. In addition the effort to achieve reparation and rehabilitation consist of 
activities of medical treatment, psychological treatment and trauma counseling, socio-
economic activities, legal advocacy and legal drafting of new regulations, which are related 
with the issue. Finally, the effort to conduct reconciliation includes the initiatives of grass-
roots peace building, public education, political lobbying and legal drafting.  
 
As to the particular issue of the effort to reveal the truth or conduct a truth-seeking mecha-
nism, the survey recommended identifying existing campaigns and collecting documents of 
human rights abuses to improve a coordinated national strategy based on clear strategic 
objectives and design project to focus the area of human rights violation.73 
 
4. 2. Civil society organizations’ initiatives in revealing the truth about the mass 
killings of 1965/6 through formal mechanism 
 
The formal mechanism acknowledged in the policy in dealing with the past abuse is the 
establishment of the TRC and the investigation process by Komnas HAM as the first step 
to establish the ad hoc HRC in this case.  
 
4. 2. 1. Pushing for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
 
Soon after the reformasi, the civil societies proposed the establishment of a TRC and a 
HRC to address the human rights violations by the previous regime and to establish a tran-
sitional justice framework. The role of civil society in the establishment of the TRC mech-
                                                
 
73 Opcit, p. 114. 
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anism was an active one, particularly in lobbying the authorities to have a legal framework 
to guarantee the establishment of this mechanism. In a similar way, the discussions were 
widespread among the civil society organizations, NGOs, human rights scholars and vic-
tims’ communities with engaging the government at the local and national level in the need 
to establish this commission as part of the tool to provide justice to the victims. ELSAM 
(The Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy), a national NGO proposed a draft of the 
TRC-law which has been discussed at the government and the parliament level between 
2000-2004.  
 
During the process, the discussion and debate in criticizing the draft of the TRC-law among 
civil society were also heated. Some argued that in this policy it is important that victims 
could deliver their stories and would enhance the justice and national reconciliation pro-
cess.74 On the other hand, others also argued that the government should strengthen the role 
of the human rights court, as the perpetrators were still part of the government and they 
could disrupt the democratic transition. The establishment of the TRC would grant impuni-
ty for the perpetrators.75 Furthermore, victim’s communities also highlighted the im-
portance of revealing the truth and providing justice as a first step to conducting reconcilia-
tion.76 Finally, the government enacted Law No. 27/2004 on the TRC on 6 October 2004.  
 
However, article 29 of the Law stipulated that the TRC had a power to recommend amnes-
ty for perpetrators of serious crimes and any cases under consideration of the TRC could 
not be prosecuted in the HRC. The other problem of the Law was the provision of the repa-
ration programme that victims would only obtain compensation if the perpetrators of the 
crimes against them had already received the amnesty. Therefore, the coalition of the 
NGOs and representatives of victims challenged these provisions by submitting a request 
                                                
 
74 Elsam (2003). 
75 KontraS (2003). 
76 Note, Elsam (2003). 
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for a judicial review on the TRC-Law to the Constitutional Court because the provisions of 
the law violated the victims’ constitutional right to remedy. 77 
 
Eventually, in 2006, the Constitutional Court annulled the entire Law because according to 
the Court, the provisions challenged by the complainants were essential elements of the 
entire Law. Furthermore, the court provided for the possibility to pass a new regulation or 
reconciliation effort by political policies on rehabilitation and amnesty.78 However, the 
coalition of the NGOs and representatives of the victims of the human rights violations 
responded that the verdict should be read that the government has to settle the past human 
rights abuses with a comprehensive strategy to guarantee the victims’ rights on the transi-
tional justice framework.79 In this new development, the civil society organizations are still 
monitoring the process of the establishment of a new law, which currently is being dis-
cussed in the Ministry of Law and Human Rights after almost 10 years in absent.  
 
Moreover, in this effort, there were various international NGO’s supported the advocacy to 
the Indonesian NGO’s. They are facilitated various conferences, conducted research and 
participated in the court process as experts. 
 
4. 2. 2. Pushing a pro justicia investigation on mass killings of 1965/6 to the Na-
tional Human Rights Commission 
 
Based on Articles 19 and 20 of Law No. 26/2000 on the HRC, the pro-justicia investigation 
team of Komnas HAM has a mandate to conduct an inquiry into the incidents allegedly 
                                                
 
77 The Team of Advocacy of Truth and Justice (Elsam, KontraS, SNB, Imparsial, LBH Jakarta, and YAPHI) 
in 006/PU-IV/2006 on Judicial Review of the Law 27/2004 on TRC, September 20, 2006. 
78 The decision of 006/PU-IV/2006 on Judicial Review of the Law 27/2004 on TRC. 
79 Press release on the coalition of the NGO’s and representative of victims of the human rights violation: 
“The Verdict of Constitutional Court Affirms State Obligation to Settling the Past Human Rights Abuses,” 8 
December 2006. 
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constituting gross violations of human rights.80 The team has strong authority; including 
calling the witnesses, victims or related parties with the case and gathering the evidence to 
follow up for further judicial proceeding. 
 
Therefore, the civil society organizations, including national NGOs, KontraS and various 
victims’ organizations urged for the establishment of the pro-justicia team on the case of 
mass killings 1965/6.81 They were push that the establishment of a pro-justicia team will be 
the follow up of the previous research team on “Alleged human rights violations in Buru 
Island following the mass killing 1965/6”82 as part of the “Report on the Research Team of 
the Gross Violation of Human Rights by the Soeharto Regime” by Komnas HAM, which 
had already been conducted between 2002 and 2007. From that report, Komnas HAM con-
cluded that there was an indication that gross violations of human rights took place in Buru 
Island after 1965/6.83  Komnas HAM eventually established the ad hoc team for pro-
justicia investigation into human rights violations related to the events of the mass killing 
in 1965/6 in 2008.  
 
The civil society has intensively and closely been monitoring the process of the implemen-
tation of the investigation’s team. For example, KontraS, conducted two strategies on push-
ing the effectiveness of team. First, they assisted the team by organizing the victims groups 
in many regions to provide testimonies, facilitating communication between the team and 
the victims, providing information, and contributing inputs in each steps of the investiga-
                                                
 
80 Under Article 7 the Law No. 26/2000, gross violations of human rights consist of two crimes: crimes of 
genocide and crimes against humanity  
81 Joint press release: Forty Years of Mass Killings 1965/6: Push to revealing the truth and providing repara-
tion to the victims, 1 October 2007; Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC): Delegation to Indonesia’s 
National Human Rights Commission urges an end to impunity for the massacres of the past, 1 October 2007. 
82 Around 3000 forced labor’s victims were forced to work under the arbitrary detention in the camp of Pulau 
Buru (Buru Island) in Maluku.  
83 Joint press release: “1965 Tragedy is not finished, Komnas HAM has the obligation to respond to it,”14 
March 2007. 
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tion. The hearing activities were conducted in a closed environment to avoid attention from 
fundamentalist and vigilante groups. Second, they criticized the team in public, by conduct-
ing open meeting, demonstrations with victims and made open statements.84 Furthermore, 
in the effort to raise the common voices of justice, KontraS was involved in the national 
coalition of KKPK and build the regional and international solidarity, such as with TA-
POL,85 ICTJ, Amnesty International, AHRC and others.  
 
Since the beginning of the investigation team, KontraS, supported by TAPOL, facilitated 
the consolidation meetings for 1965/6 victims in 10 regions in Indonesia, one regional 
meeting in Sulawesi and one national meeting in Jakarta in order to guard the Komnas 
HAM’s pro-justicia investigation. The meetings were intended to deliver information on 
the progress of the investigation to the victims, prepare victims to face pro-justicia investi-
gation and develop strategies to advocate the case at the local, regional and national level. 
KontraS was also assessing the initiatives undertaken by the victims in the regions to build 
a synergy with national advocacy agenda. In a meeting at the national level, KontraS facili-
tated the victims to meet the state government and decision makers.86 
 
Due to the pressure from the NGOs and victims groups, finally published the report of the 
Investigation into the Gross Violations of Human Rights on the Event of 1965/6 on July 
23rd, 2012.87 Komnas HAM concluded several important things in the executive summary 
of the report. First, there is sufficient primary proof to suspect that crimes against humanity 
                                                
 
84 KontraS, Letter to the Chief of Komnas HAM: Settlement of the pro justicia investigation of the 1965/6 
gross violation of human rights, 6 July 2011; Press Release of the 1965/6 victims group: Establish the Human 
Rights Court and Provide Reparation for Victims, 6 July 2013;  
85 TAPOL (Tahanan Politik, political prisoner) is the human rights NGO based in the UK. Established in 
1973 by Carmel Budiardjo, a political prisoner in Indonesia on the case of mass killing 1965/6 and was ac-
tively campaign for release of the tens of thousands of political prisoners remaining in Indonesia following 
the case and in support of the relatives of the hundreds of thousands who were killed.  
86 KontraS (2013). 
87 The Jakarta Post: “Komnas HAM declares 1965 purge a gross human rights violation,” 23 July 2012. 
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have taken place in the form of gross violations of human rights. Second, the types of acts 
and patterns of the crimes against humanity that took place in the events of 1965/6 were 
murders, killings, slavery, forced eviction and illegal transportation of population, arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty and deprivation of other physical freedoms, torture, rape or other ill-
treatments, similar forms of sexual violence, maltreatment (persecution) and enforced dis-
appearances. Third, the alleged perpetrators and/or those responsible for events of 1965/6 
were identified as individuals, military commanders or members of state institution units.  
 
Furthermore, Komnas HAM also issued a number of recommendations, such as: the gen-
eral prosecutor of the AGO was requested to follow up the result of this investigation with 
further judicial inquiry; the result of the investigation can also be resolved by a non-judicial 
mechanism to fulfil the need for justice of the victims and their relatives, including through 
the establishment of the TRC. 
 
However, Komnas HAM acknowledged that the investigation process faced various obsta-
cles, because of the wide geographical spread of the event of 1965/6, the limitations of the 
budget, the length of the events (both in the length of time and the period that have passed 
since), and the trauma that the victims have experienced.88 The other obstacles came from 
the internal situation that not all the members of Komnas HAM approved the establishment 
of the investigation team due to various reasons, including being reluctant to face the pres-
sure and political risks. Therefore, the internal mechanism to approve on the particular de-
cision was polarizing. In addition, there were high pressure and intimidation from official 
and unofficial sources, including threats of violence to the members of the investigation 
team. Several times, anti-communist groups also protested and demanded the team to be 
disbanded. For all the threat and intimidation, the police failed to investigate.89  
 
The civil society organizations welcomed the Komnas HAM’s investigation report as the 
                                                
 
88 Komnas HAM (2012) 
89 Stanley Adi Prasetyo, 7 April 2014.  
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new momentum to reveal the truth of the crimes against humanity of 1965/6 under the tran-
sitional justice framework. The civil society organizations called for several follow-up de-
cisions to various authorities to providing response of the recommendation from Komnas 
HAM, including truth, reparation and accountability. As this case has created special pat-
tern on Indonesia history, various state organization should follow it up , including the 
President, the AGO, the parliament, and LPSK The Witnesses and Victims Protection 
Agency) to provide remedies to the victims.90 Similarly, to echo the Indonesian civil socie-
ty’s call, Amnesty International also demanded the government responsibility by reminding 
that effort to give effect to victims’ right to the truth about what actually occurred must 
form a part of a wider framework of accountability in Indonesia.91 Moreover, TAPOL 
called on the President to take all necessary measures to follow through these groundbreak-
ing investigations and end the impunity, which has prevailed for so long in Indonesia.92 
 
4. 3. Civil society organizations’ initiatives in revealing the truth about the 
mass killings 1965/6 through informal or unofficial truth mechanisms 
 
Among several obstacles to deal with the comprehensive transitional justice framework in 
the current impunity situation is that there have been few initiatives from civil society or-
ganizations to demand state’s responsibility in a broader perspective. One of the efforts is 
the initiative to build the alternative truth-seeking measure, particularly to raise public 
awareness about what actually occurred on 1965/6, so that subsequently there is more pop-
ular pressure to the state to address this situation.  
                                                
 
90 Press release of KontraS, AJAR, Elsam, IKOHI, LBH Jakarta, 1965/6 Victims:  Report of the Investigation 
of Komnas HAM on the crimes against humanity 1965/6: A New Momentum Against New Order Correction, 
July 25th, 2012. 
91 Amnesty International: Attorney General must act on Komnas HAM report on 1965/6 violations, 27 July 
2012. 
92 TAPOL: Human Rights Commission reveals the truth about 1965/66 crimes against humanity, August 
23rd, 2012 
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The most common activities of the civil society, particularly victims group are regularly 
commemorating a number of human rights days related to the past abuses events and to 
build memorials. Furthermore, various victims’ organization in the field is collecting the 
testimonies, documentation and actively calling for solidarity in regional and national level. 
Some of them are YPKP 1965 (Research Foundation for Victims of 1965/6), Pakorba (Vic-
tims of the New Order Association), LPKP 65 (the Research Institute for Victims of the 
1965 Tragedy), LPRKROB (Organization for the Rehabilitation Struggle for New Order 
Victims), KKP HAM 65 (the 1965 Human Rights Victims Action Committee) and SEK-
BER 65 (Joint Secretariat for 1965). In addition, victims’ communities are also writing 
down or filming oral history of the victims of the mass killings of 1965/6.  
 
On the other hand, several civil society organizations initiated a local reconciliation be-
tween the communities and the perpetrators involved in the field. Syarikat, (Religious So-
ciety for Advocacy on Behalf of People) one of the organizations in Yogyakarta conducted 
regular local reconciliation, while some of the perpetrators was the member of NU. Simi-
larly, JPIT SPAB (Easter Indonesia Women Networks for Women Studies, Religion and 
Culture), one of women organization in Nusa Tenggara Timur was collected the documen-
tation from the perpetrators, which had affiliated with the churches organization. Their ef-
fort to reveal the truth from perpetrators in the field and build a local reconciliation was 
contributed for the better social life in their community. On the other hand, in the national 
level, FSAB (Children of the Nation Gathering Forum) is organized a reconciliation in 
elites actors, facilitated by former Chief of MPR, Taufik Kemas.  
 
The significant contribution also comes from scholars, who are trying to investigate the 
facts of mass killings of 1965/6. It is very significant for revealing the truth and strengthen-
ing the historical claim from the academic’s perspective. Furthermore, the victims’ groups 
are also engaging with a high school history teachers’ association to write a supplementary 
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history book for high school students, which includes of several of the facts that were ma-
nipulated by state during authoritarian regime.93 In addition, ISSI (the Indonesian Institute 
of Social History), one of the historian organization is also has been collecting the docu-
mentation, which based on the interviews, papers, film and other material.  
 
However, among various efforts from the civil society organizations in revealing the truth 
and achieving justice, I would like to describe more deeply on the civil society organiza-
tions’ initiatives with regard informal mechanisms or unofficial truth mechanisms during 
the term of President of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014). 
 
4. 3. 1. Local initiative for truth: SKP HAM Palu94  
 
SKP HAM Palu (Solidaritas Korban Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia Palu, Solidarity for 
Human Rights Violation Victims Palu) initiated the effort to acknowledge the mass killing 
of 1965/6 in Central Sulawesi Province.  
 
The mass killing 1965/6 was still considered as complex problem in the fields, including in 
Palu. High pressure of the political and social discrimination has been causing the long 
trauma, both for the victims and the perpetrators. SKP HAM is trying to empower victims, 
including collecting all the testimonies (around 1,028 testimonies) and providing healings. 
Therefore, revealing the truth on the events was chosen as the strategy to build the “neigh-
bourhood reconciliation” in achieving the common purpose of justice.95  
 
SKP HAM conducted regular meetings with victims at the village level, which they called 
as “Diskusi Kampung (Village Discussion).” They invited the local state officials, tradi-
                                                
 
93 JSKK, JRK, AGSI, and Yayasan Tifa (2009), “Saatnya Korban Bicara, Menata Derap Merajut Langkah 
(The Time for Victims to Speak, Arranging Clattering, Treating Step).” 
94 Further information: www.skp-ham.org 
95 Lamasitudju (2012). 
 41 
tional community leaders, religious leaders, and women and young people to join the dis-
cussion of mass killings of 1965/6. In some occasions, they also supported children of the 
mass killings 1965/6 victims to become the head or leader of their respective villages. The 
similar strategy was taken at the districts, sub-districts and provincial level. In some of the 
events, they invited the regents and mayor to be involved in their discussion activities.96  
 
SKP HAM also organized several ceremonies to commemorate the human rights memorial 
days. SKP HAM id managed to invite both the victims and perpetrators of mass killings 
1965/6 to give testimonies with public and state officials also attending the event. The suc-
cess story came after some of the perpetrators made testimonies and eventually offered 
apologies to the victims, which was acknowledged as the initiative of the community rec-
onciliation in Palu. The Mayor of Palu, Rusdi Mastura himself responded to this initiative 
and made a speech to deliver an apology on behalf of himself and the local governance.97 
In addition to this, the Mayor also promised to fulfil the victims’ rights through: providing 
the free health treatment to the victims through the government program of Jamkesda (re-
gional health insurance); providing the opportunity of working through the government 
program of Padat Karya (development program by using intensive human resources); 
providing scholarship for the relatives of the victims; acknowledging 13 forced labour sites 
as memorial tourism; and exhuming the mass grave in Palu to identify victims of 1965/6.98  
 
                                                
 
96 Ibid. 
97 The Mayor comes from the Golkar Party. He is the descendant of Masyumi family, the now defunct Indo-
nesian Muslim Consultative Assembly, which was involved in a bitter battle with the Communist Party in 
1960s. He is also the former chairman of the Pancasila Youth, an old organization in Central Sulawesi, which 
was involved in mass killings 1965/6. The Jakarta Post, “Rudy Mastura, the Mayor who said sorry for 1965,” 
25 October 2013. 
98 Nurlaela Lamasitudju, 7 June 2014. 
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On the other hand, based on the testimonial documentation, which was collected by SKP 
HAM Palu, LKK (Humanity Creative Institution)99 and TAPOL published a book with the 
title  “Sulawesi Bersaksi” (Sulawesi Testified), which reveals the survivors testimonies on 
the mass killings of 1965/6 in Sulawesi. From the testimonies, lots of the survivors’ wishes 
were simple: only to have the truth revealed.100 Furthermore, SKP HAM drafted the decla-
ration of Palu as a city of human rights awareness as an input to the Mayor of Palu.  Final-
ly, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights and Mayor of Palu announced a campaign of 
Palu, Kota Sadar HAM (Palu, a City with Human Rights Awareness) on 20 May 2013 to 
commemorate Hari Kebangkitan Nasional (the National Awakening Day). The fulfillment 
of rights for the victims was one of the key points in the declaration.  
 
To get the formal apology by the Mayor of Palu, SKP HAM has conducted several meet-
ings and lobbies with the local government, although it took long bureaucratic procedures 
because of the special need of the victims of 1965/6 in accessing the programs. Initially, 
SKP HAM proposed the policy of the acknowledgment of the mass killing in 1965/6 in 
Palu and the fulfilment of remedy to the victims. Subsequently, SKP HAM supported by 
the KKPK was drafting a Perwali (Mayor’s Regulation) of the Apology and Rehabilitation 
for 1965/6. They also conducted workshop with the local government officials, scholars, 
Komnas HAM, Komnas Perempuan (National Commission on Violence Against Women), 
LPSK and the NGOs to receive inputs on the draft. Nevertheless, there have been various 
resistances from the local bureaucracy officials on the content of the draft.101  
 
 
 
                                                
 
99 The organization established by Putu Oka, the poet, writer, former journalist and practitioner who was 
imprisoned without trial due to his membership in Lekra.  
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4. 3. 2. National initiative for truth: KKPK102   
 
Another initiative from civil society organizations in Indonesia, specifically with regard to 
unofficial truth initiatives was a series of activities called  “the Year of Truth (Tahun 
Kebenaran)” which was conducted by the KKPK (Koalisi Keadilan dan Pengungkapan 
Kebenaran, Indonesian Coalition for Justice and Revelation of Truth) the KKPK- and its 
members.  
 
The coalition was established in 2008103 and currently has members of 47 national and lo-
cal NGOs, victims’ organizations as well as human rights activists in Indonesia,104 which 
have concerns with regard to the issue of human rights and impunity in Indonesia.  
 
The initiatives on the establishment of the coalition emerged during the joint advocacy of 
the NGOs on the new law of TRC, after the Constitutional Court revoked it in 2006, and 
also in advocating the ad hoc human rights court of East Timor in 2000 and the establish-
ment of the Commission of Truth and Friendship Indonesia-East Timor in 2005. Further-
more, the coalition were also advocating the process on state accountability policy in Aceh 
after the 2005 Helsinki peace process. KPK Aceh (The Coalition of Revealing the Truth in 
Aceh) submitted the proposal on the integration of the implementation of the existing ad 
hoc Human Rights Court and the TRC in Aceh to the government in 2007. Therefore, they 
were focussing on the issue of revealing truth initiatives.  
 
                                                
 
102 Further information at www.kkpk.org. 
103 In the establishment, all active members of KKPK were NGOs and had been actively advocating the past 
abuses problem in Indonesia under various initiatives. Some of them were KontraS, Elsam, IKOHI, PEC, 
Syarikat, YAPHI Solo, and one of the international NGO, ICTJ (which later transformed to AJAR).   
104 The NGOs are working on the issue of civil and political rights as well as on the issue of economic, social 
and cultural rights.  
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However, in their internal meeting in 2010, based on the civil society’s advocacy reflec-
tion, they formulated the new strategy. The coalition should have a long-term goal in ad-
dressing impunity, which will also be achieving justice. The indicators of achieving justice 
will also include the process of revealing the truth and also of providing reparation for vic-
tims of human rights violations. The judiciary process and truth initiatives should be com-
plementary. However, based on the current political situation, revealing the truth should be 
addressed as the first step for achieving justice for victims. In the broader context, justice is 
placed as the social transformation purpose.105 The strategy was also building a better col-
laboration at local (grass roots) level and national level. Later, KKPK developed a strategy 
that addressing the massive impunity should also reflect the violations of and the lack of 
fulfilment of economic, social and culture rights.106  
 
The case of mass killing on 1965/6 was acknowledged as an important case, and it also 
became a source of on-going violence and produced new violence. The case was shown as 
the symbol of impunity, which occurred in almost all the regions in the country. However, 
KKPK is also dealing with the current human rights violation as an on- going violence and 
the impunity from past violation.  
 
As an alliance, the KKPK has regular meetings for building strategy and evaluate on the 
advocacy of past abuses cases. KKPK has also synergizing the planning and works among 
their members. KKPK decided to conduct the alternative unofficial truth seeking mecha-
nism by conducting “A Year of Truth,” between December 2012 and December 2013. The 
initiative came from the common consensus and long term dialogue among civil society 
organizations (NGOs, victims groups, scholars and others), which acknowledged that the 
past abuses have been unsolved up till now and are even emerging as an on-going conflict 
and lack of effective remedy in the accountability process. However, revealing the truth is 
very significant to dig up the real problem and supporting the realization of the state ac-
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countability. In particular for victims, the fulfilment of the right to the truth is a part of the 
remedy to impulse the sense of closure. The momentum of the general elections is im-
portant to remind again that the impunity in Indonesia is still an on-going problem. There-
fore, revealing of the truth initiatives is also important to build a new dialogue as a national 
consensus and build a non-recurrence mechanism for past abuses.107 
 
During a year of activities, the regional hearings of unofficial truth seeking were conducted 
in Central Java, Eastern Nusa Tenggara, Central Sulawesi, Aceh and Papua in providing a 
space for victims to speak out and give testimonies. Since the human rights violations of 
the mass killings 1965/6 were widespread, victims of this case mostly participated in the 
regional hearings. The hearings were following the reflection of Majelis Warga (Citizen 
Council), who will respond to it with “the truth moral voice”: strengthening victims to de-
mand their constitutional rights; spreading the public awareness on the cases of past human 
rights abuses in the context of the nation’s history and to pressure the state to establish state 
policy for a settlement of past human rights abuses, including an official mechanism for 
revealing and acknowledging the truth. As part of these activities, the alliance has been 
collecting the documentation, organized the Cultural Week Festival, a road show to the 
universities, and hearings with the state agencies during a year. Public participation is en-
gaged in various event conducted.  108  
  
The significant momentum of this initiative in revealing unofficial truth was the organiza-
tion of the national hearing of “the Year of Truth”. The event had a sub-title of “Bicara 
Benar: Memutus Lingkar Kekerasan” (Speaking the Truth, Breaking the Circle of the Vio-
lence) in November 2013. The alliance invited 30 victims of human rights violations from 
provinces across Indonesia to step forward to share their experiences with their fellow In-
donesians. They testified in front of a “Citizens’ Council”, a committee of 22 prominent 
national figures who acknowledged that the recognition of Indonesia’s violent history was 
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the keystone for the nation’s transition to democracy. The representative attended the hear-
ings came from state officials, including Komnas HAM, Komnas Perempuan, Ministry of 
Social, Ministry from Law and Human Rights Department, Ministry of Health and the Par-
liaments. The hearings is also conducted in live streaming and engage with media. Victims 
touched upon subjects at the core of Indonesia’s crimes against humanity, including vio-
lence against women, religious conflicts, conflicts over natural resources, military opera-
tions, and the rigid climate of impunity. The victims of mass killings 1965/6 participated on 
various themes of the hearings. 109 
 
After hearings for 5 days and scrutinizing the victims and survivor’s stories, the Citizen 
Council made conclusions that all of their experiences were the humanity modal to continu-
ing in establishing a fair and humane nation. Victims are having strength and courage to 
face their dark past. However, the culture of impunity remains a legacy of the past. There-
fore, support from civil society organizations is essential. Nevertheless, the most important 
factor, which is still absent, is the political will from the state, including its security sector 
during its transitional reform. The KKPK recommended that the government admit human 
rights violations did occur, and to apologize to the victims. The hearing is also recom-
mended that in the coming new government, truth and justice should be used as a value and 
legal foundations of the nation.110  
 
Furthermore, the KKPK will publish their collection of the documentation of human rights 
violations in Indonesia and report on “the Year of Truth” in October 2014. This document 
will become the advocacy tool in revealing the truth and urging state accountability on the 
human rights violations in Indonesia.111 
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   4. 3. 3. International initiative for truth: The Act of Killing 112 
 
Another initiative by civil society group, which had an encouraging worldwide response, 
was the publicity on the documentary film “The Act of Killing” (TAoK) directed by Joshua 
Oppenheimer and his anonymous team members in 2012. The director, Oppenheimer is an 
American who initially produced a film about plantation workers and story of their family 
being the victims of mass killings of 1965/6 in Medan, North Sumatra. The other film 
crewmembers are professional filmmakers from Indonesia. The team was mostly Indone-
sian nationals, but chose to be anonymous because they realized that there could be a harm-
ful risk or reprisals toward their security.   
 
Unlike other similar documentary films about the mass killing of 1965/6, which usually 
emphasised on the victims’ story, TAoK is focusing on the testimonies by the perpetrators 
of the mass killing in 1965/6 in Medan, North Sumatera Province. TAoK was made based 
on the story of former killers who later on have led in a relatively successful life because of 
their role in the 1965/6 atrocities. The film was made to reenact the perpetrators’ action in 
torturing and murdering their victims. The feeling of not being guilty of the perpetrators 
seemed to be caused by the persistent culture of impunity and the fact that many perpetra-
tors are still active in some strategic position in current Indonesia’s political system. There-
fore, TAoK is showing the banality within the society, lack of law enforcement and impu-
nity in Indonesia.113 
 
The directors closely cooperated and built strategies with the civil society in Indonesia pri-
or to the final production of the film. Oppenheimer had met human rights activists, 
filmmakers, journalists, members of Komnas HAM and various experts, including historian 
and legal experts, years before the launch of the film discussing the possibility of the na-
tion-wide distribution and screening and the security of the Indonesian crews. Initially, 
                                                
 
112 Further information www.theactofkilling.com 
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before the publicity of the film, the TAoK team screened the film to limited audience in 
Jakarta and built the strategy to disseminate the film. It was agreed that the publicity in 
Indonesia should be limited at the grass root communities, locally and less publicity using 
the guerrilla-screening tactic, because of the possible high risk of reprisal. Furthermore, in 
some areas, there are several anti-communist group organizations that always act against 
this kind of issue. However, Tempo Magazine, a well-known Indonesian national magazine 
published a special report on the mass killings of 1965/6 in the title of “Requiem on Mas-
sacre”, in October 2012. The coverage of the magazine also focused the perspective of the 
perpetrators, mirroring the approach of TAoK film. The nation wide publicity of this film 
in Indonesia was started on the International Human Rights Day, 10 December 2012, to 
ensure the film, and the discussions it sparks, would add momentum to demands for ac-
countability for human rights violations. The other strategy taken by TAoK’s team was not 
to register the documentary film into the Censorship Film Institution in Indonesia,114 be-
cause there would be a risk that the film would be prohibited which, in turn, would be an 
excuse for violent vigilante action (by paramilitaries and the military, for instance) against 
screenings. Later, the further strategy was uploaded the film at the YouTube in September 
2013 for free access from Indonesia to engage more people in Indonesia in understanding 
the truth about the mass killings in 1965/6. The film has screened thousands of times in 
Indonesia, and is available there online, where it has been viewed or downloaded millions 
of times. This has helped catalyze a transformation in how Indonesia understands its past. 
115 
 
On the other hand, this documentary film was screened worldwide. The first screening was 
in Toronto, Canada, in August 2012 at the Toronto International Film Festival, one of pres-
tigious international film festivals. Subsequently, the film was screened in various countries 
attracting also media coverage. In addition, the film received international prestigious 
recognition, including awards and distinctions. TAoK was nominated for the 2014 Acade-
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my Award for Best Documentary Feature and received 9 awards, including BAFTA and 
Asia Pasific Screen Award e film also received several Festival Awards, Critics Awards 
and nominations in various festivals.  
 
The worldwide recognition and publicity of the film exposed the entrenched culture of im-
punity for 1965/6 to the international community. Since the film is merely a portrait one of 
bigger violations among enormous and systematic mass killing of 1965/6 in Indonesia, 
many people in the audience observed what actually happened in the past and questioned 
the truth of the occasion. Furthermore, some viewers expected that a successful striving for 
justice could establish the balance of power, enhance the judiciary system through a tribu-
nal, reparation and formal apologies. In this area, the role of the directors and the team is 
significant to contribute to the truth revealing in Indonesia. In his speech, Oppenheimer 
always reminded the audience that the film reflected the situation of 1965/6 in which the 
people still face prolonged violence recently due to lack of the state correction on the histo-
ry.116 
 
Revealing the truth initiative on this case also disclosed the hidden story behind it namely 
that some of western countries supported Soeharto against the emerging communism in 
Indonesia in the context of the Cold War and that they were also accomplices in the mass 
killings of 1965/6. As part of the screenings, there were some interactive discussions to 
involve the film audience in the issue of the mass killings in 1965/6. International human 
rights NGOs or academics in several countries initiated the discussions.117 Furthermore a 
campaign was also carried out to urge for an apology and accountability on this case in 
Indonesia, such as the campaign of “Say Sorry For 65”.118 
                                                
 
116 Statement of the Director in TAoK website. 
117 For example, the public discussion conducted by Amnesty International in the Netherland, Watch Indone-
sia in Germany, TAPOL in the United Kingdom, ETAN in the USA, or various universities in the USA, UK, 
Australia and others.  
118 Campaign of TAPOL and ETAN  
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After screenings internationally, the publicity and following the discussion in Indonesia has 
been widespread and open to the public. However, the response from society, scholars and 
the state government officials was influencing the discourse of the importance of revealing 
the truth on the mass killing of 1965/6 in the democratic transition in Indonesia.  
 
In Melbourne and Jakarta, various actors including scholars, historian, and human rights 
activist conducted the online discussion in tittle “What Next After The Act of Killing: His-
torical Justice and the 1965-66 Mass Killings in Indonesia?” The director of TAoK was 
also invited and joins in the discussion.119  
 
Asvi Warman Adam, the historian stated that the stigma of the past was among the leftists 
and debates on the past continue. However, a new phenomenon developed that perpetrators 
are giving testimonies as can be seen in the movie The Act of Killing. On the other hand, 
the freedom of the press enjoyed by Indonesians during this era of reform has had a posi-
tive influence on the historical revelation of various issues that were suppressed in the 
past.120  
 
In addition, at the end of August 2014, Joshua Oppenheimer will screen “The Look of Si-
lence,” a companion piece to TAoK in the Toronto International Film Festival. The film is 
about a family who, after viewing the film of TAoK discovered and confronted the former 
militiamen who murdered their son in the event of 1965/6.121 This initiative will provide 
another view of truth seeking on the survivor’s side.  
 
 
                                                
 
119 The Jakarta Post, What next after The Act of Killing? 30 September 2013 
120 The Jakarta Post, Fifteen Years Against New Order Stigmatization, 4 January 2013. 
121 The Jakarta Post: Joshua Oppenheimer, Facing the Monster in the Dark, 30 March 2014. 
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5. State responses to civil society initiatives aimed at revealing truth of mass kill-
ings 1965/6  
 
I will focus on the situation during the administration of President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono (SBY) (2004-2009 and 2009-2014). His presidential term will end in October 
2014. 
 
In SBY’s first presidential term, he provided a set of vision; mission and program for gov-
ernance’s reform agenda. However, among those programs, there are no specific issue on 
addressing Indonesia history of human rights abuses.  
 
5. 1. In responding to truth initiatives policy from civil society 
 
During both of President SBY’s terms, there has been no progressive development in the 
establishment of the Law of the TRC after it was annulled in 2006. On paper, the estab-
lishment of the Law on a TRC as a tool to deal with past abuses was also a mandate from 
the Presidential Degree No. 40/2004 on the RANHAM (National Action Plan of Human 
Rights) 2004-2009. However, it was not included again in the Presidential Degree No. 
23/2011 on the RANHAM 2011-2014. In 2011, the Prolegnas of the parliament (National 
Legislation Program) stated that the Law on a TRC should be discussed and debated during 
the period, but it was not cited in the further Prolegnas of the following years.  
 
However, in the beginning of his second term, SBY seemed to show increasing aware ness 
of the need to settle past gross human rights violations cases. On 26 March 2008 – ten 
years in to the reformasi period and the 10th anniversary of the founding of KontraS, Presi-
dent SBY invited KontraS and several victims of past human rights violations to the Presi-
dential Palace. 10 victims and family of the victims attended the meeting where they direct-
ly demanded accountability for what happened to them. Previously, the victims’ communi-
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ty had been consistent in demanding justice by holding the “Aksi Kamisan” (Thursday Vir-
gil)122 since January 2007 (up to now). With regards to the issue of past abuses, the Presi-
dent promised to follow up the recommendation to his cabinet members, including the At-
torney General, the Chief of the Indonesian National Police, the Minister of Justice and 
Human Rights, and other relevant state agencies to discuss the resolution of the cases.123 
Since the meeting with the President, KontraS has actively engaged with personal advisors 
of the President, including the Expert Staff in Legal and Human Rights Affair, Denny In-
drayana.  
 
Based on that engagement, further on the President invited Ifdhal Kasim (The Chairman of 
Komnas HAM (2007-2012) and Usman Hamid (The Coordinator of KontraS) and dis-
cussed the strategic approach to dealing with various human rights violation in the past on 
28 July 2010. However, in that meeting, The President stated that:  
 
“I think I can do something for the case in 1998, such as Trisakti, May and even the 
Student Disappearances (in 1997/8). I believe the military institution would not re-
fuse it. Even if it the Human Rights Court will be established, and will bring 
Prabowo124 to justice or it will be (a court) for Muchdi PR125 in Munir’s case. I do 
                                                
 
122 Aksi Kamisan (the Thursday Virgil) is a regular silent peace demonstration in front of the Presidential 
Palace every Thursday, between 4 and 5 pm. It was initiated by some the victims of past human rights viola-
tions. Initially they demanded justice for all of the past abuse cases, but now they also support demands for 
justice for ongoing violations taking place in the country. As part of the silent demonstration, they also sent a 
letter every week to the President reiterating their demands. Since the vigils started on 17 January 2007 up to 
17 July 2014 (and it is still on-going) they have been standing and sent 360 letters to the President. Due to the 
support from other group in different regions, the initiative of Aksi Kamisan is also adopted in Bandung 
(West Java Province) Yogyakarta and Riau. 
123 KontraS (2008). 
124 Prabowo was a commander of the Kopassus (Special Forces of Indonesia Army), 1995-1998. Later he was 
dismissed due to his involvement in the case of the disappearances of student activists 1998. However, he 
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not mind at all to enact the Presidential Degree (for ad hoc Human Rights Court)... 
However, for the mass killings of 1965/6 cases, to be honest, I frankly do not want 
to be seen challenging my former “mentor”. Do you know what I mean?”126 
 
The statement indicated that for specific issue on mass killing 1965/6, the President would 
not do anything to address it. He is the son in law of Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, the Command-
er of RPKAD (Army Para Commando Regiment), who was in charge of many military 
operations to “cleanse” the country of the communist members and supporters. This made 
him as one of the most important actors in mass killing of 1965/6. He also confessed on 
deathbed that he was responsible in the killing of around 3 million people. 127 
 
Furthermore, through the President personal advisor on legal and human rights affairs, 
Denny Indrayana, he received the recommendation from KontraS (later on, KKPK added 
some materials for the recommendations) on the proposal of the strategic approach for the 
President to settle the past human rights abuses. The recommendations in the proposal Ke-
bijakan Presiden untuk Keadilan bagi Korban Kasus HAM Masa Lalu (Presidential Policy 
for Justice for the Past Human Rights Abuse Victims), are:   
 
1) To establish a Presidential Committee for Justice and Fulfilment of Victims 
Rights. The committee would be has mandated to reveal the truth based on the pro-
                                                                                                                                               
 
refused to become a witness during pro-justicia investigation. Subsequently, he was running for the Deputy 
Presidential candidate (in the 2009 election) and the Presidential candidate (in the 2014 election). 
125 Muchdi was a commander of the Kopassus, 1998, who was accused being involved in the disappearance 
of student activists 1998, but he was never brought to justice court. He became a Deputy V of the BIN (State 
Intelligent Body) and was suspected as one of the masterminds in the killing of Munir, a prominent human 
rights defender in Indonesia, who was killed by poison in 2004. In 2008 the South Jakarta District Court ac-
quitted him in the murder cases. There are many critics say that the judiciary was intimidated and manipulat-
ed during the legal proceedings.  
126 Usman Hamid, 3 August 2014; Note August 2010. 
127 Tempo Magazine (November 2011).  
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justicia investigation by Komnas HAM; strengthening the accountability process; to 
guarantee the non-recurrence of past abuses by removing all discriminatory policies 
and regulations.  
2) To conduct the official statement to apology in acknowledging the past human 
rights abuses.  
3) To provide restorative justice for victims, including the urgent need for victims 
such as medical treatment and psychological support.128  
 
On the special issue of apology, the President promised to issue a public statement on 17 
August 2010, in his annual speech to mark Indonesian Independence Day. However, no 
apology has yet been made. 
 
As a follow up meeting, in May 2011 the President conducted another meeting with Kom-
nas HAM to discuss the acceleration of solution for past human rights abuses case. Subse-
quently, the President established the teams to settle the gross violation of human rights 
under the supervision of the Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Legal and Human Rights. 
The Ministry then established an inter-departmental team to implement the policy. In 2011, 
the President s also appointed Denny Indrayana to become the Deputy Minister in the Min-
istry of Human Rights. On the other hand, the President appointed Albert Hasibuan as the 
President’s Advisory Council Member for Law and Human Rights Affair.129 Denny In-
drayana emphasized that he had been given a special mandate from the President to deal 
                                                
 
128 The final written proposal for President was submitted to the staff of legal and human rights affairs, Denny 
Indrayana on 18 August 2012. Later, this proposal was also submitted to the Presidential Advisory Council, 
Albert Hasibuan, November 2012. 
129 Albert Hasibuan is a former Commissioner of Komnas HAM and involved in several human rights inquiry 
team to investigate allegation of gross violation of human rights, including the 1999 East Timor Atrocities 
team. 
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with the settlement of the cases of past abuse. 130 Similarly, Albert Hasibuan stated that the 
President has a commitment on this issue. The President told him that:  
 
“History burden in the society of Indonesia have to be terminated, so the Indone-
sia’s future will be brighter.”131   
 
Furthermore, Albert Hasibuan was also assigned to formulate a national apology for past 
human rights abuses, including to victims of the 1965/6 mass killings. During this process 
he invited various stakeholders, including human rights activists, scholars, victims of past 
abuses and experts to discuss on the implementation. Albert Hasibuan stated that this poli-
cy would be a positive step for the President towards creating a strong human rights legacy 
after he leave office.132  The appointment of these two persons initially raised hope among 
the human rights’ community in the country considering their integrity and past experienc-
es in human rights field. 
 
In another major development, in July 2012 Komnas HAM released the findings of a three 
years investigation in to the 1965/6 mass killings, in which it alleged that gross human 
rights violations, which may amount to crimes against humanity, were committed. Among 
recommendations made by Komnas HAM was a call for the government to issue an official 
apology for the events of 1965/6. However, the report was met with negative responses, in 
particular by NU, one of the biggest Islamic mass organizations in Indonesia, elites from 
the Golkar party, and the biggest political party during authoritarian regime. Both organiza-
tions strongly rejected Komnas HAM’s findings and recommendations. They stated that 
they justified their action because the PKI was also guilty and could demolish the nation 
                                                
 
130 Notes, KontraS and the Deputy Ministry of Law and Human Rights, 4 January 2012. 
131 Albert Hasibuan, 14 May 2014 
132 Ibid. 
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and Komnas HAM should blame the Communist party for being the main actor-conducting 
coup against the existing government.133  
 
In responding the Komnas HAM’s summary report on the mass killing of 1965/6 case, the 
President only gave a normative response to the allegation of crimes against humanity in 
1965/6. He said that he would instruct the Attorney General to study the report and guaran-
teed that the case should be solved by good, fair, factual, smart and constructive way.134 
Although Komnas HAM as a state institution published the findings of its investigation, 
other state agencies immediately undermined it. Strong refusal, for instance, came from the 
Coordinating Minister of Political, Legal and Security Affairs Djoko Suyanto, stating that 
the mass killings, which were state-sponsored action according to the Commission’s find-
ing, were justified to save the country from the communist’ threat. He asked President not 
to make an official apology for the atrocity, arguing that the killings should be seen in a 
unique historical context.135 Similarly, the Commander of TNI (the Indonesian Military 
Forces) Comr. Adm. Agus Suhartono shared Djoko’s position, saying that the TNI would 
not deliver any apology.136 
 
Separately, as predicted earlier, the AGO refused to follow up the investigation of Komnas 
HAM because the evidences gathered by them were considered insufficient to justify an 
official legal investigation.137 This argument is actually a “common” reason from the AGO 
to respond to any investigation reports, including 6 cases of crimes against humanity by the 
                                                
 
133 Kompas, Nahdatul Ulama Refused Apology to the Victims of 1965, 15 August 2012; Tempo, SBY Asked 
to Don’t Apologize to Victims, 5 August 2012. 
134 Berita Satu, President Instruct the AGO to scrutinize the finding of Komnas HAM, 26 July 2012.  
135 Jakarta Post, Government Denies 1965 Rights Abuses Happened, 2 October 2012. 
136 Jakarta Post, 1965 Mass Killing Justified: 1 October 2012. Minister, Jakarta Post, Government Denies 
1965 Rights Abuses Happened, 2 October 2012. 
137 The Jakarta Globe, AGO Rejects Komnas HAM Report on 1965 Massacre, 10 November 2012.  
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Komnas HAM. It is also shows that Komnas HAM gained limited support and cooperation 
from the government to implement its function.138  
 
However, it is actually the duty of the AGO to conduct the further investigation and to col-
lect evidences based on Law 26/2000 on HRC. On February 2014, the current Commis-
sioners of Komnas HAM (2012-2017) submitted a letter requesting a meeting with the 
President, but he did not respond it.139 It seemed the progress of accountability of the mass 
killing of 1965/6 case went back to the lowest level again. 
 
However, Komnas HAM’s recommendations in urging the government to initiate prosecu-
tion were heard and echoed by those at the international level. In particular, he UN Human 
Rights Committee, a monitoring body of the ICCPR, urged the Indonesian government, as 
a matter of urgency, to address the impasse between Komnas HAM and the AGO in deal-
ing with cases of past human rights abuses.140 There were also strong recommendations 
from the international community during Indonesia’s second review under the Universal 
Periodic Review (UPR) at the UN Human Rights Council. Member states recommended 
that the government of Indonesia combat impunity and take any measure to ensure the pro-
cess of accountability of past abuses.141 However, there is no information on the progress 
by the government in implementing these recommendations. 
 
On the other hand, there was another initiative from another independent human rights 
commission, Komnas Perempuan aimed at revealing the truth of the 1965/6 mass killings 
and it also become another “official document of truth” in this case. Komnas Perempuan 
collected testimonies and documentation from a number of female victims during that time. 
The report, entitled “Kejahatan Terhadap Kemanusiaan Berbasis Gender: Mendengarkan 
                                                
 
138 Komnas HAM report to the UN Human Rights Committee (2013), p. 3.  
139 Roichatul Aswidah, 21 April 2014. 
140 Human Rights Committee CCPR/C/IDN/CO/1 (2013). 
141 Universal Periodic Review, A/HRC/21/7 (2012). 
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Suara Korban Peristiwa 1965 (Gender Based Crimes Against Humanity: Listening the 
Voices of Women Survivors of 1965) recommended that the President and other state insti-
tutions take steps to reveal the truth, and provide an effective remedy for the victims, in-
cluding special reparation measures for female victims. Nevertheless, no progress is taken 
by the government to implement the recommendations.   
 
5. 2. In responding unofficial to truth initiatives from civil society 
 
In other specific initiatives from the civil society organizations in conducting unofficial 
initiatives aimed at uncovering the truth about mass killing of 1965/6, the state responding 
with different views.  
 
In January 2014 Rusdi Mastura the Mayor of Palu, in Central Sulawesi Province made a 
speech to deliver an apology on behalf of himself and the local government. This was the 
first local official apology from the regional governance administration in Indonesia for the 
victims of mass killing 1965/6. At last, the Mayor of Palu was also enacted Perwali (Mayor 
Regulation) No. 25/2013 on the RANHAM Daerah (National Plan on Human Rights in the 
Region). 
 
This regulation is part of the policy under the RANHAM 2010-2014. The content of the 
regulation is also consisting of general issue of human rights and not specific stating the 
case and the victims of mass killings 1965/6, but has merely three articles, which specifi-
cally regulate the fulfilment of the remedy for the victims.142   
 
However, this regulation is important because this is a formal acknowledgment of the mass 
killing 1965/6 cases in Palu and it recognizes the existence of the victims of 1965/6 case. 
This regulation will become a foundation of the local government to fulfil the rights of the 
                                                
 
142 Lamasitudju (2014). 
 59 
1965/6 victims. Most importantly, this regulation could encourage other local state institu-
tions to conduct the policy of revealing the truth on the 1965/6 mass killings in their region 
and develop their own local policies to fulfil victims’ right to an effective remedy for the 
harm they have suffered.143  
 
At the national level, beside of the respond for the “circle” of the President, the Chairman 
of the MPR (People Consultative Assembly), Sidarto Danusubroto was also responding the 
initiatives of KKPK in December 2013, which previously also had a meeting with the pre-
vious Chairman of MPR, Taufik Kemas, in February 2013.144 During the meeting, the 
KKPK submitted the initial report of the activities of “the Year of Truth” and urged him to 
take initiatives to establish a policy to settle the comprehensive strategy in dealing with the 
cases of gross violations of human rights. The Chairman of the MPR promised to take that 
initiative and submitted it to the President.  
 
On the other hand, the release in 2012 of the film of The Act of Killing had a significant 
impact on the campaign for accountability for the mass killing of 1965/6. In response to the 
film, Komnas HAM stated that: 
 
“If we are to transform Indonesia into the democracy it claims to be, citizens must 
recognize the terror and repression on which our contemporary history has been 
built. No film, or any other work of art for that matter, has done this more effective-
ly than The Act of Killing. [It] is essential viewing for us all.”145 
 
However, state officials were highly critical of the film, in particular because its release 
came soon after the publication of the Komnas HAM investigation, at a time when public 
discourse on the mass killings was widespread. The Coordinating Minster of Political, Le-
                                                
 
143 Nurlaela Lamasitudju, 2 July 2014. 
144 Dodi Yuniar, 14 April 2014. 
145 Reaction of Komnas HAM in TAoK website.  
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gal and Security Affairs, Djoko Suyanto stated that if the mass killings didn’t happen, In-
donesia would not be the country it is today.146 Similarly, Teuku Faizasyah, the presidential 
spokesman for foreign affairs said that the film was out of date, and asserted that Indonesia 
had gone through a process of reformation.147 
 
When the film was nominated for an Academy Award, right afterwards the Indonesian 
president finally made an official statement (even though the President’s office claimed 
that he had not seen the film). The President’s spokesman acknowledged that the 1965 
genocide was a crime against humanity, and that Indonesia needs reconciliation, but in its 
own time. These remarks represented a U-turn by the government: until then, it had main-
tained that the killings were something to be celebrated: heroic and glorious.148 
 
5. 3. Reaffirming the state denial on the truth of mass killings of 1965/6 
 
From the description above, it is clear that up to the end of SBY’s Presidency, there has 
been no significant impact on the state’s formal mechanism in dealing with the past, includ-
ing the mass killing of 1965/6 case. SBY’s term – and his administration – will end in Oc-
tober 2014, however there is strong demand from civil society for him to use his remaining 
time in office to leave legacy, which contributes, to fulfilment of victims’ rights. Unfortu-
nately, there is no guarantee that he will take any initiative to fulfil his promise and it de-
pends only on his political will.149 
 
Indonesia is developing its position in the regional and international arena. The democrati-
zation and its economic growth have given the country a bigger reputation in regional and 
global affairs. The country is becoming a significant actor, which could influence the polit-
                                                
 
146 The Diplomat, Beyond the Killing: Indonesia and the Price of Unity, 24 August 2013. 
147 The Jakarta Globe: Indonesia reacts on “The Act of Killing” Academy Nomination, 23 January 2014. 
148 Joshua Oppenheimmer, 10 July 2014. 
149 Albert Hasibuan, 14 March 2014. 
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ical impact globally. Based on the size, strategic location, growth economic potential and 
procedural democratic process, the international community recognized Indonesia as the 
most democratic country in Asia.150 Indonesia is also active in the various international 
forums aimed at strengthening world economy, through its membership in the members of 
major economics G20 (Group of twenty) or to strengthening the human rights promotion in 
Southeast Asia, in particular as the initiator of the establishment of the ASEAN Intergov-
ernmental Commission of Human Rights (AICHR). In fact, Indonesia is showing a good 
image internationally. Therefore, there is no strong demand from international community 
to settle with the past atrocities. The recommendation from the various UN mechanisms to 
hold to account those responsible for past atrocities and combat impunity might easily be 
ignored with few repercussions for the government.  
 
In this stage, the governance adopted the “implicatory denial,” of mass killings 1965/6. 
Since Komnas HAM already released the investigation report, the state does not deny that 
crimes against humanity occurred in 1965/6, but it justifies these crimes because – it argues 
– the PKI conducted a violation to the people prior to the 1965 coup. Recently, based on 
the state response, it is justified by political rationalization that the situation was similar to 
a war condition: we have to kill others or they will kill us.  
 
 
 
                                                
 
150 Lowy Institute Analysis For International Policy, (2014).  
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6. Analysis on the civil society initiatives in calling for truth about mass killing of 
1965/6 under the transitional justice framework in Indonesia 
  
The pressure to deal with the past makes it increasingly problematic for countries in demo-
cratic transition to ignore the past.151 NGOs and other civil organizations in Indonesia un-
dertake a range of activities in advocate the mass killings of 1965/6, including advocacy, 
collecting documentation; facilitating meetings between victims and state agencies; service 
delivery intervention; pushing for the acknowledgement of past crimes; conducting re-
search and education; facilitated the reconciliation in the local and national context and 
collaborating with various civil society in local, national and international arenas. These 
activities are similar with other NGOs in the world in dealing with the transitional justice 
framework, as described by David Backer.152 This is also acknowledged by Komnas HAM, 
which recognized that, the role of civil societies, including NGOs and victims’ groups were 
very supportive of the process of investigation into mass killing 1965/6. NGOs role to facil-
itate victims becoming witnesses, lobbying and criticizing through media were considered 
as strengthening the function of the Komnas HAM’s investigation process.153 
 
Prolong impunity is strengthening the state denial in the country. Furthermore, people in 
Indonesia generally do not give sufficient attention on the issue of past abuse. On the other 
hand, victims of past violations are also getting old (even most of them are already dead) 
and are pessimistic about opportunities for truth and justice. Therefore, during “reformasi” 
era, the civil society is regularly enhancing their strategy on both aspects.  
 
Firstly, the strategy to enhance their self to advocate the past abuses case, including the 
mass killing of 1965/6. The current the situation reflected by the KKPK shows that after 
                                                
 
151 Arenhovel (2008), p. 583. 
152 Backer (2010), p. 304-305 
153 Stanley Adi Prasetyo, 7 April 2014. 
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more than 16 years of “reformasi”, generally, civil society is still in a weak position to push 
the transitional justice framework for past abuses in Indonesia. Internally, the NGO’s and 
victims organization is fragmented in their own concern and lack to establish the common 
strategy. Furthermore, number and capacity of civil society organization is decreasing since 
they receive less support from international donors and international agencies due to differ-
ent interest and strategic priorities. Therefore, building the common strategy, aim and ob-
jective in their work is essential, as reflected on the strategy of KKPK. 
 
However, a few NGO’s and civil society organizations have played – and continue to play 
– a significant role in Indonesia’s political transition. Greater respect for freedom of ex-
pression has also meant NGOs and victims groups receive support from the media in rais-
ing awareness. Improved engagement with government policy makers is also important for 
demanding the state address past abuses. Therefore, while NGOs have the expertise and 
experiences on specific theme of dealing with the past, the strategy to build a critical en-
gagement with the government is also developing.154  
 
Moreover, strengthening the role and networks among local, national and international 
agencies, including international NGOs is very useful in developing common goal and ob-
jective. This can be seen in the relation of the Indonesian NGO’s with the other interna-
tional NGO’s or other group, which has a common concern as the TAoK groups. The col-
laboration of these actors provides the understanding condition under which international 
human rights regimes and the principles, norms and rules are embedded. The diffusion of 
international norms in the human rights area crucially depends on the establishment and the 
                                                
 
154 Critical engagement is the current strategy of KontraS. Recently, based on the political change in Indone-
sia, the challenge of advocacy of the human rights violation is to maintain the professionalism and independ-
ency. Critical engagement is offering the concept to engage with the governance institution but still critical, 
particularly in public on advocating the issue of human rights.  
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sustainability of networks among domestic and transnational actors who manage to link up 
with international regimes.155 
 
Secondly, to choose the strategy that achieving justice will also include the process of re-
vealing the truth and providing reparation for the victims under the transitional justice 
framework. Various discussions among civil society is recognized that truth could be a 
general concept in relation with other rights and contributing to ending impunity promotes 
and protects human rights.156 Therefore, revealing the truth is the strategy to entrance jus-
tice and providing knowledge of truth to the society as well as the pushing the acknowl-
edgment from the state. 
 
Based on the experiences from civil society in revealing truth by official and unofficial 
initiatives in “reformasi” era, they manage to provide alternative truth; particularly bring 
the knowledge in the society. However, political constraint from the government is also 
still strong. Why the acknowledgment is only can recognized in special region, Palu, Cen-
tral Sulawesi Province? Why the state is still denial whereas the international watch the 
impunity situation after the wide world publicity of TAoK? Why the establishment of na-
tional TRC as a formal mechanism is take long process? Why the formal acknowledgment 
from the state is very difficult to achieve? 
 
Building the unofficial truth initiatives aimed at uncovering the truth about what happened 
in the past, including 1965/6 mass killings is important. This effort will put victims voice in 
the “centre of truth,” based on their experience, suffering and struggling in achieving jus-
tice. Holding public hearings across different regions in Indonesia, documenting testimo-
nies and conducting awareness raising activities is very significant in this effort.  
 
                                                
 
155 Risse, Ropp, Sikkink (1999). 
156 Right to the truth, E/CN.4/RES/2005/66 
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The example initiative of SKP HAM Palu is reflecting that the initiative in the province is 
also important as a tool in pushing the acknowledgment to the local governance. Further-
more, international pressure from the publicity of TAoK is also significant to push the gov-
ernment. However, the national NGO’s is taking a role to actively holding the critical en-
gagement with the national state official in pushing the acknowledgment of the mass killing 
of 1965/6.  
 
Therefore, conducting various initiatives in revealing the truth is enhancing knowledge of 
Indonesian public and taking a more active role in pushing for a change in breaking the 
impunity wall in the country. As long as the Indonesian public remains indifferent, the 
government will continue to ignore its responsibility to fulfill victims’ rights to truth and 
justice. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
I would like to draw a number of conclusions based on this study by answering the research 
questions that I proposed previously. Chapter 3 answered research question No. 1 on the 
implementation of transitional justice framework, particularly truth seeking policy applied 
in “reformasi” era. Chapter 4 and 6 answered research question No. 2 on the civil society’s 
initiatives aimed at revealing truth of mass killing of 1965 influence the truth seeking poli-
cy under transitional justice framework and the analysis of their role. Furthermore, Chapter 
5 answered the question No. 3 on the state response to civil society’s initiatives in mass 
killings 1965/6, which is also the state position in addressing past abuse.  
 
The study concludes that the civil society’s initiatives have played an important role in 
pushing for truth of mass killing of 1965/6 to be uncovered. Despite prolonged political 
constraints and the state denial of the events of 1965/6, civil society can and should play a 
significant role in formal and informal truth revealing initiatives, in providing alternative 
knowledge to the public, and pushing for formal acknowledgement from the state.  Howev-
er, after more than 16 years of reformasi, the framework of transitional justice has not yet 
been able to function properly as an integral approach in settling the past human rights 
abuses in Indonesia. “Postponed transitional justice” during these transitional years is still 
on going in Indonesia. Therefore, truth, justice, reparations and the guarantee of non-
recurrence for past abuses, as a comprehensive framework of transitional justice, are still 
very difficult goals to achieve. What civil society had done during the “reformasi” era 
highlights that achieving the integrated approach takes a long time and requires a gradual 
process. 
 
Based on the assessment of the political transition during the “reformasi” era, it shows that 
most of all of the regulation and policy with regard to the human rights, particularly related 
to the settlement of the violations of the previous regime, was established by political nego-
tiations. The mass killings of 1965/6, including the ongoing violence afterwards, illustrates 
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the pattern of impunity in Indonesia, which still remains through systematic repetition. The 
case demonstrated how issues around uncovering the truth about the past is clearly subject 
to political will and political negotiation. It can be seen from the process of the setting up 
of a formal mechanism in revealing the truth in the country, which are the establishment of 
the TRC and pro-justicia investigation of Komnas HAM. Some actors in the government 
and parliament, who have relation with the previous regime, have their interest in enacting 
the Law of TRC, which ignored the victim’s rights as well as international human rights 
laws. Furthermore, the proses of pro-justicia investigation of Komnas HAM faced various 
obstacles. The investigation of this case is the longest investigation of the past abuse cases 
in Indonesia. During the investigation process, Komnas HAM received systematic refusal 
from the political party members and Muslim organizations or fundamentalist and militia 
groups, which always stated that “Communism will resurrect” if any organizations of indi-
viduals raise the issue of mass killings of 1965/6. The most difficult situation is that the 
state itself – in the form of the Attorney General’s Office – is refusing to follow up the in-
vestigation report of Komnas HAM. Furthermore, there is no significant effort from the 
government, including the President, in integrating the investigation report of Komnas 
HAM as part of the truth mechanism for the 1965/6 case, as well as providing justice and 
reparation to the victims and their families. However, the UN recognized that the investiga-
tion report of NHRI in the country could be acknowledged as the formal truth by the state. 
Therefore, the integrated framework of transitional justice in Indonesia has not yet func-
tioned properly, due to lack of political will from the state. This situation indicates that this 
framework is merely a politically negotiated concept in the democratic transition of the 
country, as also discussed in the development of the concept of transitional justice in the 
UN. 
 
The prolonged impunity and political constraints in addressing the past abuses brings a 
special concern for human rights organizations to have a realistic strategy in advocating for 
accountability for past abuses, focusing on only very few priorities. Truth seeking has two 
dimensions: individual rights and collective rights. Therefore, revealing the truth of mass 
killing of 1965/6 is not only important for the victims and their families, but also for socie-
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ty in the country as a whole. It is commonly agreed by the human rights organizations that 
revealing the truth will also have a positive impact on other elements under the transitional 
justice framework.  
 
Besides calling for the truth to be uncovered through formal mechanisms, the other alterna-
tive is to addressing the truth through informal mechanisms. The effort of SKP HAM in 
Palu to push the local government to acknowledge the victims of mass killings of 1965/6 in 
Central Sulawesi and apologize becomes a portrait of the willingness of the local govern-
ance in acknowledging the past. This is also an opportunity to urge the similar policies in 
other provinces. Furthermore, the other cultural way to revealing the truth such as the pub-
licity of TAoK is also significant in informing the knowledge of the truth of this case 
worldwide, and particularly in the local society to build the local reconciliation. The re-
sponse from the government to the publicity of TAoK has also increased knowledge to the 
people nationally, as well the “force” acknowledgment from the state. In addition, building 
various unofficial hearings – raising victims’ voice – in the regional province on the mass 
killings of 1965/6 and collecting documentation and information, which are conducted by 
the KKPK, is also important to enhance the truth-seeking in the society as well as provid-
ing knowledge to the people as part of the truth revealing initiative. This initiative is also 
important for the healing process for the victims and families themselves. The strategy of 
civil society in building coalitions and networks locally, national and internationally 
strengthens common efforts towards revealing the truth of mass killings of 1965/6.  
 
Various initiatives revealing the truth have influenced the state position in responding the 
mass killings of 1965/6. During the authoritarian regime, the state adopted the “literal deni-
al” of the case. They were providing their own propaganda on the facts of the violation. 
However, in tandem with the political transition in the country, the state is also changing its 
position of denial. From the recent developments, particularly after the publication of the 
Komnas HAM investigation report and the worldwide attention of TAoK, the state is 
changing the position to “implicatory denial”. The state does not deny that crimes against 
humanity occurred in 1965/6 but justifies this crime. However, the government is still re-
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fusing to acknowledge the case, providing the “historical clarification” and apology for 
victims.  
 
I would argue that adopted the transitional justice framework is rather ambitious as the in-
tegrated approach in addressing the past. However, as an ideal concept, this framework still 
significant and has to become a foundation of a human rights advocacy. Therefore, civil 
society, including NGOs and victims’ groups should consider the changing political situa-
tion in the country. Choosing realistic goals and methods will make the advocacy more 
strategic. In this current situation in Indonesia, revealing the truth of mass killings of 
1965/6 can also significant impact efforts to achieving other victims’ rights, including jus-
tice. Providing knowledge to society and achieving acknowledgment from the state is sig-
nificant in seeking the truth.  
 
Indonesia will have new political administration in October this year. The role of the Presi-
dent is very significant in dealing with this crucial issue. Since the president-elect doesn’t 
have any connection with the human rights problems of the past and has a proper program 
of addressing the past abuse, the effectiveness of the strategy of civil society to deal with 
this will be tested.  
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